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Abstract
While there is a vast literature on optimal bankruptcy laws and, specifically, on the optimal
allocation of control rights between debtors and creditors in corporate bankruptcy, little has been
said about the role that alternative insolvency institutions may play in the design of the optimal
insolvency framework. This paper attempts to fill this gap by modelling two insolvency institutions
-a bankruptcy system and a foreclosure system- that firms and their creditors may use when dealing
with financial distress. Firms choose between one or the other based on lenders’ willingness to
provide credit and the trade-off between two inefficiency costs, those from inefficient liquidations
and those from productive inefficiencies caused by overinvestment in capital assets. The model’s
key result is that welfare is a non-monotonic function of creditor control rights in bankruptcy,
implying that a perfectly “creditor-friendly” bankruptcy code (a code that always grants control
of the distressed firms to creditors) is very inefficient. A second result is that welfare is higher
when the bankruptcy system is too “creditor-friendly” (i.e., it ensures the provision of credit, but
generates too many inefficient liquidations) than when it is too “debtor-friendly”. Hence, if the
optimal level of creditor control rights in bankruptcy cannot be ascertained in practice, it may be
better to grant too much control of the bankruptcy process to creditors than too little, as the loss
from undershooting that level is larger than that from overshooting it.
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1 Introduction
Many papers have analysed the optimal allocation of control rights between debtors and credi-
tors in corporate bankruptcy. Creditor-friendly systems seem to promote the ex-ante provision
of credit better than debtor-friendly ones because they deter borrower’s moral hazard (La Porta
et al., 1997, Davydenko and Franks, 2008), but at the expense of generating more ex-post in-
efficient liquidations because creditors are inherently biased towards liquidating the firm (Hart,
2000). Debtor-friendly systems are supposed to induce greater innovation and ex-ante efficient
risk-taking than creditor-friendly ones because they promote continuation upon failure (Acharya
and Subramanian, 2009), but they may lead to excessive inefficient continuations. To solve this
tension between ex-ante incentives and ex-post outcomes, mainly arising from the concave (convex)
nature of creditors’ (debtors’) claims, some authors have proposed to allocate significant control
rights to third parties, such as judges or insolvency practitioners, as long as they are able to make
the correct decision regarding the reorganisation or liquidation of the distressed firm (Ayotte and
Yun, 2009). By contrast, other authors have advocated a “contractualist” bankruptcy system that
limits the discretion of courts to strict enforcement of contracts and, based on the evidence on
floating charge financing1 (Franks and Sussman, 2005, Djankov et al., 2008), have proposed a
debt structure with two classes of debt, one that gives control upon default to a large creditor
and another fully dispersed debt class without control rights, which would remove the controlling
creditor’s liquidation bias (Gennaioli and Rossi, 2013).
However, the existing literature on optimal bankruptcy seems to assume that the bankruptcy
system is the only insolvency institution, implying that, if private workouts fail -mainly because
of coordination and asymmetric information problems2- bankruptcy is unavoidable. But this as-
sumption does not seem to be warranted by the empirical evidence. Morrison (2008) documents
1A floating charge is a security interest in which the whole firm can be pledged as collateral, including working
capital, intangibles and future cash flows.
2See, inter alia, Gilson et al. (1990) and Hart (2000).
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that only twenty percent of distressed small3 businesses file for bankruptcy in the U.S, while the
rest use non-bankruptcy procedures. These procedures include both private workouts and formal
debt enforcement procedures such as foreclosures, bulk sales4 and assignments for the benefit of
creditors.5 García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) report that, while around 8,000 firms filed
for bankruptcy in 2012 in Spain, there were more than 26,000 business foreclosures. A foreclosure is
a non-bankruptcy procedure that is used worldwide,6 even though its implementation differs across
countries in several aspects. A foreclosure aims to recover the money owed to secured creditors by
seizing the loan’s collateral. It does not protect unsecured creditors, who must rely on separate
insolvency proceedings to enforce their claims. In some countries the insolvent company can pre-
vent creditors from foreclosing on its assets -an stay on the firm’s assets- by filing for bankruptcy,
while in others a bankruptcy filing does not stop foreclosure.7 In some countries a foreclosure can
be an entirely out-of-court procedure, a private contractual solution in which a receiver liquidates
the company to maximise the recovery of the senior creditor,8 whereas in others a court oversees
foreclosure, although it is typically less involved than in bankruptcy.9
This paper’s main contribution is to analyse the trade-offs faced by firms and their lenders
in a context where an alternative debt-enforcement institution -the foreclosure system- exists, so
that agents can “contract out” bankruptcy even when bargaining costs are too high to undertake
a private workout. Specifically, credit contracts can be enforced under the bankruptcy system or
under the foreclosure system. These two insolvency institutions differ in two crucial aspects: the
3Defined as those with less than 500 employees.
4In a bulk sale the debtor sells most or all of its business to a third party and distributes the proceeds to creditors.
5In an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the business assigns its assets to a trustee, who auctions them off
and distributes the proceeds to creditors.
6Djankov et al. (2008) identify three basic insolvency procedures that are used around the world: (1) foreclosure
by the senior creditor, (2) liquidation and (3) reorganisation, which often leads to subsequent liquidation if the
reorganisation attempt fails. (2) and (3) are specific types of corporate bankruptcy (e.g., Chapter 7 and 11 in the
U.S., respectively).
7In the latter case, as pointed out by Djankov et al. (2008), bankruptcy procedures may take place in parallel
with foreclosure procedures.
8That was the case of Administrative Receivership in the U.K. before the entry into force of the Enterprise Act
2002, which abolished it.
9In the U.S. there are both types. The judicial foreclosure involves the sale of the mortgaged property, subject
to auction, under the supervision of a court. The non-judicial foreclosure involves the sale of the property via a
public auction by the mortgage holder without court supervision.
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liquidation technology and the probability that creditors are granted control of the firm’s assets
following default, which measures the institution’s degree of ”creditor-friendliness”. We assume that
the liquidation technology of foreclosures is more efficient than that of bankruptcy procedures, in
the sense of providing higher liquidation proceedings for the same liquidation value. We also
assume that the probability that creditors get control of the distressed firm’s assets is higher in
foreclosure than in bankruptcy.
In that context, firms choose between one insolvency institution and the other based on lenders’
willingness to provide credit and the trade-off between two inefficiency costs, those of ex-ante
productive inefficiencies and those of ex-post inefficient liquidations. The trade-off occurs because
firms may overinvest in capital to increase their assets’ liquidation value, which reduces funding
costs.10 This overinvestment generates productive inefficiencies but, by increasing the liquidation
value, it reduces the cost of inefficient liquidations (going concern value minus liquidation value).
All these effects can take place in both institutions, but with different frequency and/or mag-
nitude. The foreclosure system, by always granting control of the firm’s assets to creditors in
the event of default, deters borrowers’ moral hazard and promotes the provision of credit, while
the bankruptcy system only does it as long as creditor control rights are sufficiently protected.
But, because of the same reason, the foreclosure system leads to more inefficient liquidations than
the bankruptcy system, as creditors are inherently biased towards liquidation. Finally, as the
foreclosure system has a better liquidation technology than the bankruptcy system, it provides
incentives to overinvestment in capital, which leads to lower liquidation costs, at the expense of
greater productive inefficiencies.
The model’s key result is that welfare is a non-monotonic function of the level of creditor control
rights under bankruptcy. This result has a direct policy implication: a perfectly “creditor-friendly”
bankruptcy code (a code that always grants control of the distressed firms to creditors) is very
inefficient. In fact, it is so inefficient that agents would never use it, as the alternative insolvency
institution, foreclosure, leads to the same number of inefficient liquidations but provides higher
recovery rates to creditors and lower funding costs to firms. A second result is that welfare is
10The overinvestment in capital can take place in two different ways, the “intensive margin” and the “extensive
margin”. The intensive margin consists of exceeding the optimal proportion of capital for a given business project.
The extensive margin consists of choosing projects that require a high proportion of capital assets over projects
with higher productivity but a lower proportion of these assets. For simplicity, in the current model we only analyse
the intensive margin, leaving the analysis of the extensive margin for further research.
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higher when the bankruptcy system is too “creditor-friendly” (i.e., it ensures the provision of
credit, but generates too many inefficient liquidations) than when it is too “debtor-friendly”. In
other words, if the optimal level of creditor control rights in bankruptcy cannot be ascertained in
practice, it may be better to grant too much control of the bankruptcy process to creditors than
too little, as the loss from undershooting that level is larger than that from overshooting it. The
intuition is that, as the optimal level of creditor control rights is the minimum that makes the
credit contract feasible under bankruptcy, when creditor rights exceed the optimal level, the two
insolvency institutions can be used, so that each firm chooses the one that maximises its payoffs.
However, when creditor rights are lower than the optimal, only one institution, foreclosure, can be
used. As bankruptcy and foreclosure are imperfect substitutes, if firms are heterogenous in some
characteristic that makes them differ in their preferred insolvency institution (in this model, the
marginal cost of overinvestment in capital), then a too “creditor-friendly” bankruptcy system may
yield higher welfare.
A related result is the positive correlation between welfare and bankruptcy rates: when creditor
rights are high (low), welfare is high (low) and bankruptcy rates are high (low). This theoretical
prediction seems corroborated by the empirical evidence if we proxy welfare with per capita GDP
(Claessens and Klapper, 2005; Celentani et al., 2010). While there are a number of alternative
explanations for the correlation between bankruptcy rates and per capita GDP, the mechanism
analysed in this paper may explain part of such a correlation. Moreover, by showing that low
bankruptcy rates may be associated with low levels of welfare, the model explains why policy-
makers should be wary of the former, at variance with common wisdom: if they suspect that the
bankruptcy law does not provide enough protection to creditors, then they should assess whether
bankruptcy rates are “too low” (for instance, by international standards).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the base model and solves for
the optimal credit contracts under each insolvency institution, bankruptcy and foreclosure. Section
3 analyses the choice of insolvency institution by a representative firm. Section 4 generalises to a
set of heterogenous firms in order to study the impact of the institutional design on welfare and
bankruptcy rates. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of lemmas and propositions and other technical
details are in Appendices A-F.
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2 Model
2.1 General model: distress resolution via private workouts
In principle, individuals can deal with financial distress themselves -i.e., without the use of an in-
solvency institution- via a private workout. A firm and its creditors may write their own insolvency
procedure by specifying as part of a debt contract what should happen in a default state.
Consider a three-period model11 (t = 0, 1, 2) in which there is a wealthless firm manager and
a perfectly competitive lender.12 Both players are risk-neutral and there is no time discounting.
Market interest rates are normalised to zero. The manager owns an investment project, which
requires an initial outlay of I > 0 at t = 0 for the purchase of some productive assets.13
If the manager had I available (first-best), she would undertake the project. The project cash
flows would be e⇡1 = ⇡ with probability ✓ or e⇡1 = 0 with probability 1 – ✓ at t = 1 and e⇡2 = ⇡
with probability   or e⇡2 = 0 with probability 1 –   at t = 2, where e⇡1 and e⇡2 are independently
distributed. We assume I  ✓ ⇡ for lending to be feasible under very general circumstances.14
If for some reason the project is liquidated, it yields proceedings equal to ↵l, where 0  ↵  1
captures the transaction costs incurred in liquidating the assets (i.e., the higher the ↵, the more
efficient the liquidation tecnology) and l is the project’s liquidation value.
We depart from the existing literature in the nature of the liquidation value l. While it has
always been treated as an exogenous parameter, in this model it is an endogenous variable. The
project can be undertaken with different combinations of productive assets, namely capital and
labour, which determine the project’s liquidation value. Specifically, the liquidation value l will be
proportional to the share   of the initial outlay I spent in the purchase of capital: l =  I where
11The model is an adaptation of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) who use a model of nonverifiable cash flows to
analyse the optimal debt structure as a function of the number of creditors.
12The assumption of perfect competition in the credit market is only made for analytical simplicity. In Supplement
B there is a version of the model that relaxes this assumption, proving that the model’s conclusions are robust to
different degrees of competition in the credit market.
13In this set up we use a fixed-scale model, so we implictly assume away firm size from the analysis. In Supplement
C we use instead a variable-scale model with constant returns to scale to extend the model’s conclusions to a set
up with heterogeneity in firm size.
14Specifically, that assumption ensures that financing is possible if contracting parties use the bankruptcy sys-
tem (see section 2.2.1). However, in Supplement A that assumption is relaxed in order to explore other model’s
implications.
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0     1. Hence l 2 [0, I].
There is only a proportion of capital and hence a liquidation value l that is efficient from the
point of view of the production process, as the rest of proportions lead to productive inefficiencies.
Let us call this first-best liquidation value lˆ. Since there is a direct mapping between the proportion
of the investment spent in capital   and the liquidation value l, we can express the cost of productive
inefficiencies as a function of l, i.e, D(l), where D(lˆ) = 0. If the manager deviates from the optimal
proportion of capital, then the cash flow at t = 1 would be e⇡1 = ⇡   D(l) with probability ✓ ore⇡1 = 0 with probability 1 – ✓.
Let us assume D(l) = n|l   lˆ| where n > 0. The parameter n is the marginal cost of over-
investment,15 which occurs if l > lˆ. Different investment projects may have different values of
n.
Cash flows are observable to both parties but nonverifiable to a third party such as a court of
law.16 This assumption allows for moral hazard in the form of strategic default. By contrast, loan
repayments, as well as the project’s assets and the proceeds from the sale of liquidated assets, are
verifiable. In this setting, credit contracts based on realised cash flows are not feasible because they
cannot be enforced, but they can be based on repayments made by the firm, since the relevant
judge or court can verify that the manager has defaulted and enforce the assets’ repossession
and subsequent liquidation. The threat to repossess the assets by the lender, thus depriving the
manager from the project’s cash flows at t = 2, provides the incentive for the manager to repay at
t = 1.17
Within this framework let us analyse the following credit contract. In exchange for borrowing
I at t = 0, the manager promises a repayment R at t = 1. If she repays R, she keeps control
of the firm’s assets throughout t = 2. If she does not repay, the lender assumes control of the
assets with probability  . In such a case, the lender will always liquidate the firm because he will
obtain ↵l   0 through the sale while obtaining zero if keeping it as a going concern, since he lacks
15The paper’s key results do not change if we choose an alternative cost function where the marginal cost of
overinvestment is not constant and independent of l, such as D(l) = n
⇣
l   lˆ
⌘2
.
16This can result from direct expropriation of cash flows or from managerial perquisite consumption.
17The nonverifiability of cash flows also implies that long-term credit contracts (i.e., contracts payable at t = 2)
are not feasible. Since the manager does not face any repossession threat at t = 2, she would always default and
the lender could only recover ↵l  I of the loan.
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the managerial skills to make the project generate any cash flow at t = 2. The assumption that
the lender makes zero cash flows from managing the assets by himself is just a normalisation: the
key point is that he gets more by selling the assets, which captures the classic idea that secured
creditors are inherently biased toward liquidation.18 Since the lender is perfectly competitive,
the manager has all the bargaining power and she makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the lender
{R,  , l} at t = 0.
We assume that liquidations are ex-post inefficient, i.e., the liquidation value is lower than the
continuation value: ↵l   ⇡ 8l. This implies that, if the manager does not default at t = 1 -hence
keeping control over the assets- she will want to continue the project throughout t = 2, therefore
obtaining  ⇡, instead of liquidating it herself, which would yield ↵l.
Notice that, since cash flows are nonverifiable, the manager can always choose whether to repay
R when the cash flow at t = 1 is positive or to repay nothing and default (strategic default). If the
cash flow at t = 1 is zero, then the firm must default on its debt. We abstract from renegotiation
issues by assuming full commitment.19 The model’s timeline, as well as the cash flows contingent
on the liquidation or continuation of the project -provided there is no strategic default- are shown
in Figure 120.
18In this model secured creditors are biased toward liquidation because we assume away floating charge financing,
as it is not allowed in many non-common law jurisdictions (Djankov et al., 2008).
19As in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the debt contract is not renegotiation proof.
20A more general contracting space does not change the results. In the current setup we analyse probabilistic
all-or-nothing liquidations, in which all assets are seized and sold by the creditor. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
probabilistic liquidations are combined with the possibility of partial liquidations, where only a fraction z of the
assets is liquidated. However, they show that partial liquidations are never optimal, while probabilistic liquidations
(i.e.,   < 1) are optimal, so the former can be ruled out. We could also allow creditors to take control of the assets
even if there is repayment with probability  ⇡, but it is easy to show that the solution for the optimal contract
yields  ⇤⇡ = 0 (i.e., it is never optimal to liquidate when the manager repays). Finally, one could set a repayment
schedule for both states of nature, i.e., R⇡ and R0 but, since the manager is wealthless, we need to set the feasibility
condition R0  0, which it is easy to show that leads to R⇤0 = 0.
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Figure 1: model’s timeline and cash flows (no strategic default)
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2.1.1 Optimal contract
The optimal contract maximises the manager’s expected utility EU -which is the project’s ex-
pected profits- subject to the following constraints: (1) the manager does not default strategically
(incentive compatibility); (2) the lender decides to provide credit (individual rationality); (3) since
the manager is wealthless, the repayment cannot exceed the cash flow at t = 1 in the good state
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of nature (first feasibility constraint); (4) the liquidation probability   lies in the interval [0, 1]
(second feasibility constraint). The maximisation problem is the following:
max
R, ,l
EU = ✓
h
⇡   n|l   lˆ| R +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   ) ⇡
s.t.:
⇡   nl  R +  ⇡   ⇡   nl + (1   ) ⇡ (1)
✓R + (1  ✓) ↵l   I (2)
R  ⇡   n|l   lˆ| (3)
0     1 (4)
Equation (1) shows the repayment decision of the manager. If she chooses to repay R, she
keeps the control of the firm with certainty and obtains the expected cash flow  ⇡ at t = 2. If
instead she chooses to default, she repays nothing and keeps the cash flow at t = 2 with probability
(1   ). An alternative interpretation comes from simplifying and rearranging (1):
  ⇡   R (5)
Equation (5) shows that, for the contract to be incentive-compatible, the expected punishment
for strategic default,   ⇡, must be greater or equal to the benefit from carrying out such a strategy,
R. Proposition 1 summarises the optimal contract.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract {R⇤,  ⇤, l⇤} in the case of distress resolution via a private
workout is:
(i) If 0 < ↵  1. R⇤ =  ⇡ ⇤,  ⇤ = Iq
I ⇡(1 ✓)↵
✓n
, l⇤ =
q
I ⇡
✓(1 ✓)n↵   ✓ ⇡(1 ✓)↵ . The contract is feasible
if I 2
h
✓3 n⇡
(1 ✓)↵ ,
(1 ✓)↵ ⇡
✓n
i
.
(ii) If ↵ = 0. R⇤ = I✓ ,  
⇤ = I✓ ⇡ , l
⇤ = lˆ.
The optimal contract is tailored to the project’s characteristics and, specifically, to the techno-
logical parameter n. First, notice that @l⇤@n < 0, i.e., the higher the marginal cost of overinvesting in
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capital n, the lower the optimal liquidation value l⇤. Second, @ 
⇤
@n > 0 and
@R⇤
@n > 0, i.e., projects with
higher marginal cost of overinvesting in capital n need to offer a higher liquidation probability ⇤
and a higher repayment R⇤ to the lender. The intuition is that increasing the liquidation value
reduces the required liquidation probability and repayment because the lender expects to recover
more in case of default but, as just explained, the optimal liquidation value decreases as the
marginal cost of overinvesting in capital rises. The intuition of Proposition 1(ii) is straightforward.
If ↵ = 0, then the liquidation proceedings ↵l are zero irrespective of the liquidation value l, so that
overinvesting in capital (l > lˆ) does not reduce funding costs R but it reduces cash flows at t = 1
by n|l   lˆ|. In other words, since pledging more collateral is useless but costly, no overinvestment
takes place: l⇤ = lˆ.
The main insights of the analysis are illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts welfare indiference
curves in the space (↵,  ) for a given value of the technological parameter n. The lowest welfare
is achieved in point (↵ = 0,   = 1), where the creditor always (inefficiently) liquidates in the event
of default and obtains zero liquidation proceedings. From that point welfare increases as we move
downwards and rightwards up to the point (↵,  ) = (1,  ⇤ (1)), where welfare is highest. In that
point the liquidation probability is the minimum feasible value -i.e., the minimum value that deters
strategic default, so that the lender is willing to provide credit and the probability of inefficient
liquidations is minimised- and liquidation proceedings are the highest given a marginal cost of
overinvesting in capital n. The unfeasible allocations lie below the curve  ⇤ (↵), where credit
cannot be provided.
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Figure 2: welfare indifference curves in the (α, β) space
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2.2 Special cases: distress resolution via insolvency institutions
Although a firm and its creditors may write their own insolvency procedure by specifying as part
of a debt contract what should happen in a default state, contract incompleteness makes private
workouts often unfeasible in practice (Hart, 2000). For instance, writing such a contract may be
difficult because the debtor may acquire new assets and creditors as time passes. Moreover, private
workouts are often unfeasible due to coordination and asymmetric information problems (Gilson
et al, 1990; Morrison, 2008 and 2009). In fact, the empirical evidence shows that firms rarely
write such contracts21 and that, by contrast, almost all countries have some form of state-provided
21A remarkable exception was Administrative Receivership in the U.K. Under Administrative Receivership, an
important creditor -typically a bank- contracted with the debtor to be granted a “floating charge”, which gave
the creditor the right to appoint a receiver if the firm defaulted. The receiver would take charge of the firm and
decide whether to liquidate it or keep it as a going concern. Franks and Sussman (2005) show that Administra-
tive Receivership was best seen as a privately negotiated contract between a debtor and its creditors. However,
Administrative Receivership was abolished in 2003 after the entry into force of the Enterprise Act 2002.
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insolvency institution (Hart, 2000). In other words, an insolvency institution would offer an “off
the shelf” procedure for distress resolution, i.e., one that the parties can use if they do not write
their own.
In this section we model two insolvency institutions as providers of pre-specified credit contracts
that the manager and the lender can use. The contracting game of section 2.1 can be implemented
under two different institutions: the bankruptcy and the foreclosure systems. This means that the
manager and the lender, when aggreeing on {R,  , l}, also choose which institution they will use
in the event of default, so that contracts are signed and enforced under that institution. We use
the subscripts B and F for the values of variables and parameters in bankruptcy and foreclosure,
respectively.
If parties use bankruptcy, the lender takes control of the firm’s assets with probability  B in
case of default, where  B 2 [0, 1] is an exogenous parameter set by the bankruptcy code. As in
Ayotte and Yun (2009) and in Acharya et al. (2011), we interprete  B as the variable that measures
the degree of “creditor-friendliness” of the bankruptcy law. Hence, the higher  B, the higher the
creditor control rights. In case of liquidation, the lender obtains ↵BlB, where ↵B 2 [0, 1] captures
the transaction costs incurred in liquidating the assets (litigation costs, length of the process, etc.)
and, in turn, it measures the efficiency of the liquidation technology of bankruptcy.
If parties use foreclosure, the lender assumes control of the firm’s assets with exogenous prob-
ability  F = 1 in case of default, i.e., control is transferred to creditors with certainty if the firm
does not repay the loan. In that case, the liquidation proceedings obtained by the lender are ↵F lF ,
where ↵F 2 [0, 1].
These insolvency institutions differ in two crucial aspects: the liquidation technology and the
probability that creditors are granted control of the firm’s assets following default. We assume that
the liquidation technology of foreclosures is more efficient than that of bankruptcy procedures, in
the sense of providing higher liquidation proceedings for the same liquidation value: ↵F > ↵B. This
seems a reasonable assumption, as most bankruptcy procedures, such as Chapter 11 and Chapter
7 in the U.S., are often critisized for being lengthy and costly, implying that direct and indirect
costs consume an important share of the firm’s asset value.22 By contrast, foreclosures are gen-
22According to Bris et al. (2006) and their large sample of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 cases, among firms with
assets worth less than $ 100,000, the median direct costs burn 23.2% of asset value. Among firms with assets worth
between $ 100,000 and $ 1 million, the median direct costs consume 4.9% of asset value.
13
erally cheaper and faster (Morrison, 2008, Succurro, 2012, García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti,
2014), as they are well-defined quite standardised processes with a low degree of uncertainty about
its final outcome, implying that they require less intervention by the court, insolvency adminis-
trators/trustees, accountants, lawyers, etc.23 We also assume that the probability that creditors
get control of the distressed firm’s assets is (weakly) higher in foreclosure than in bankruptcy:
 F    B. This is a very realistic assumption, as by definition the creditor repossesses the col-
lateral in a foreclosure, while in bankruptcy, depending on the procedure and the country, the
debtor remains in control of the firm (e.g. “debtor in possession” in Chapter 11 in US, concurso
voluntario in Spain), that control is transferred to creditors (e.g. administration in the U.K.) or
to a court-appointed administrator (e.g. redressement judiciare in France, concurso necesario in
Spain).
We again abstract from renegotiation issues by assuming full commitment. This assumption
is quite plausible in the case under analysis. First, the foreclosure system does not provide any
mechanism for debt restructuring: default triggers straight liquidation of the seized assets. Second,
although many bankruptcy systems allow for reorganisations, the empirical evidence shows that
most of the firms that file for bankruptcy end up liquidated (Celentani et al., 2010).24
2.2.1 Optimal contracts under bankruptcy and optimal bankruptcy code
For the study of optimal contracts under bankruptcy it is necessary to analyse first the optimal
bankruptcy code  ⇤B , i.e., the liquidation probability that maximises welfare. A way to address
the problem would be to assume that a welfare-maximising social planner chooses and announces
 ⇤B before t = 0, understanding how contracts {RB, lB} will respond in equilibrium. However, for
simplicity of exposition we assume that the bankruptcy code  B is chosen by the manager at t = 0
and offered along with {RB, lB} as part of an optimal contract that maximises his profits. The
two perspectives are equivalent (Ayotte and Yun, 2009).
The manager’s maximisation program is the same as the one for private workouts (section
23In fact, Djankov et al. (2008), in their survey of 88 countries, find that the efficiency of foreclosure rises when
the senior creditor is allowed to take collateral in an out-of-court procedure.
24Nevertheless, the analysis of debt renegotiation inside bankruptcy, while beyond the scope of this paper, yields
some interesting insights. See Tarantino (2013).
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2.1.1.) and so are its solutions (Proposition 1). For simplicity, let us set the efficiency of the
liquidation technology to zero, i.e., ↵B = 0. Since our ultimate aim is to analyse the determinants
of the choice of insolvency institution, we only care about the relative values of the key parameters,
so that the assumption ↵B = 0, which satisfies ↵F > ↵B for any ↵F > 0, does not determine our
conclusions.25 We can also find the economy’s welfare by first computing the manager’s equilibrium
utility and then making use of the fact that the lender is perfectly competitive, so its equilibrium
utility is zero. We summarise the results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B and the optimal contract under bankruptcy
{R⇤B, l⇤B} when ↵B = 0 are  ⇤B = I✓ ⇡ , R⇤B = I✓ ,l⇤B = lˆ. Welfare is W ⇤B = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   1 ✓✓ I.
In order to analyse the inefficiencies that may arise under this contract it is useful to rewrite
the economy’s welfare as W ⇤B = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)  ⇤B ⇡. The first two terms (✓ +  ) ⇡   I
express the project’s net present value in the first-best, while the last term   (1  ✓)  ⇤B ⇡ is the
expected cost of inefficient liquidations, which can be decomposed as the product of the probability
of inefficient liquidations (1  ✓)  ⇤B and the size of such inefficiency  ⇡. With probability (1  ✓)
the manager defaults and with probability  ⇤B the lender takes control of the firm and liquidates
its assets. Since the cash flow at t = 2,  ⇡, is foregone, while the project yields zero liquidation
proceeds regardless of the liquidation value l because ↵B = 0, the size of the inefficient liquidation
is  ⇡. Hence, by choosing l⇤B = lˆ the manager avoids any cost of productive inefficiencies (D(lˆ) = 0)
and the cost of inefficient liquidations is the maximum.
Furthermore,  ⇤B is the minimum level of creditor control rights that deters strategic default
by the manager and consequently makes the lender be willing to provide credit. As creditors
liquidate the firm when they are granted control over it,  ⇤B also minimises the probability that
an inefficient liquidation occurs. In other words, if  B <  ⇤B, the contract cannot be signed under
the bankruptcy institution, while if  B >  ⇤B the contract can be signed but the likelihood of an
25 Nevertheless, Appendix C shows that the model’s key results do not change qualitatively when we allow for
some positive credit recovery under bankruptcy, i.e., 0 < ↵B < ↵F .
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inefficient liquidation is not minimised, implying that welfare is lower than in the case of optimal
bankruptcy code ( B =  ⇤B ). Let us summarise these results in Lemma 3 and Proposition 4.
Lemma 3.  ⇤B is the minimum level of creditor rights in bankruptcy that makes the lender provide
credit. If  B <  ⇤B, then the contract is not feasible under the bankruptcy institution.
Proposition 4. If  B >  ⇤B, then the contract is feasible under bankruptcy. In that case the
optimal contract {R⇤⇤B , l⇤⇤B } is given by R⇤⇤B = I✓ ,l⇤⇤B = lˆ. Equilibrium welfare is W ⇤⇤B = (✓ +  ) ⇡  
I   (1  ✓)  B ⇡
2.2.2 Optimal contract under foreclosure
The analysis of the optimal contract under foreclosure differs from that under bankruptcy in two
key points: ↵F > 0 and  M = 1. ↵F > 0 makes the decision of overinvesting in capital non-trivial,
since increasing the liquidation value lF reduces funding costs RF but at the expense of incurring
in productive inefficiencies that reduce the cash flow at t = 1 by n|lF   lˆ|.  F = 1 maximises
the likelihood of inefficient liquidations, since the firm will be liquidated with certainty following
default, but it also maximises creditor protection and hence the incentives to lend.
The optimal contract and equilibrium welfare under foreclosure are summarised in Proposition
5.
Proposition 5. The optimal contract {R⇤F , l⇤F} and equilibrium welfare W ⇤F under foreclosure
when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F are:
l⇤F = I, R⇤F =
I (1 ✓)↵F I
✓ , W
⇤
F = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓) [ ⇡   ↵F I]  ✓n
⇣
I   lˆ
⌘
.
When the marginal cost from overinvesting in capital n is low enough vis-à-vis the efficiency
of the foreclosure’s liquidation technology ↵F (n  1 ✓✓ ↵F ),26 the marginal reduction in funding
26We set n  1 ✓✓ ↵F to restrict the attention to scenarios where the choice between foreclosure and bankruptcy
depends on the marginal cost of overinvestment in capital. As the maximisation problem is linear, there are two
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costs is higher than the marginal cost of productive inefficiencies, so the manager overinvests as
much as possible, obtaining the maximum liquidation value l⇤F = I. An important consequence is
highlighted by the equilibrium welfare: the cost of inefficient liquidations [ ⇡   ↵F I] is minimised
by setting the maximum liquidation value I, but at the expense of maximising the (expected) cost
of productive inefficiencies ✓n|I   lˆ|.
3 Choice of insolvency institution
The firm’s manager chooses to sign the credit contract with the lender under the insolvency institu-
tion that maximises her expected utility, which equals total welfare because the lender is perfectly
competitive, so he makes zero profits. Hence the analysis relies in the comparison of equilibrium
welfare in each of the scenarios described by Propositions 2, 4 and 5 and in the conditions under
which contracts are feasible (Lemma 3).
The choice of the insolvency institution depends on three exogenous parameters: the marginal
cost of productive inefficiencies n, the efficiency of the liquidation technology of foreclosure relative
to bankruptcy ↵F and the level of creditor control rights in bankruptcy  B. Figure 3 summarises
the results. In this section we provide the intuition behind the findings, relegating the full charac-
terisation to Appendix D.
When creditor rights in bankruptcy are lower than the optimal ( B <  ⇤B) the firm’s manager
can only implement the project under the foreclosure institution, as any contract under bankruptcy
is unfeasible (Lemma 3). When creditor rights in bankruptcy are greater than or equal to the
optimal ( B    ⇤B), both institutions are feasible, so the choice of the insolvency institution depends
on the marginal cost from productive inefficiencies. Foreclosure is chosen for some sufficiently low
values of n (n  n¯ if  B =  ⇤B, n  en if  B >  ⇤B).27 The intuition is straightforward: when the
corner solutions. When n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F (the marginal cost from overinvesting in capital n is high vis-à-vis the efficiency
of foreclosure’s liquidation technology) l⇤⇤F = lˆ, which means that the manager does not overinvest in capital. In
that case, the choice of insolvency institution depends on the values of the creditor control rights in bankruptcy
 B , the efficiency of foreclosure’s liquidation technology ↵F and the first-best liquidation value lˆ. The model’s main
results, displayed in Section 4, are qualitatively the same. A detailed analysis of this scenario can be found in
Appendix F.
27 n¯ and en are the values that make the manager’s utility under foreclosure and under bankruptcy equal for
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cost of overinvesting in capital is low enough, the manager chooses foreclosure because the gains
from lower funding costs outweigh the costs of productive inefficiencies and the higher probability
of liquidation in case of default. Notice also that, in the extreme case βB = 1, bankruptcy is
never chosen, as it has the same probability of inefficient liquidations as in foreclosure but a lower
liquidation value.
Figure 3: Choice of insolvency institution.
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As the contracts under bankruptcy and under foreclosure are special cases of the general con-
tracting game analysed in section 2.1 (private workouts), Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the choice
of insolvency institution in the space (α, β) for different values of the technological parameter n.
Points B and F show the optimal contracts under bankruptcy and foreclosure, respectively. In
Figure 4 n lies in the interval (0, n¯] and, accordingly, the welfare curve for foreclosure W F is below
that for optimal bankruptcy WB: welfare is higher if the contract is signed and enforced under the
foreclosure institution. By contrast, in Figure 5 n lies in the interval (n¯, 1−θ
θ
αF ], so the opposite
occurs: the welfare curve for optimal bankruptcy is below the one for foreclosure.
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Figure 4: welfare indifference curves in the (α, β) space with 0 < n ≤ n¯
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Figure 5: welfare indifference curves in the (α, β) space with n < n ≤ 1−θ
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4 Aggregate welfare and bankruptcy rates
So far we have discussed the case of a single firm. For the analysis of aggregate welfare and
bankruptcy rates -number of firms that file for bankruptcy divided by the stock of active firms-
it is convenient to move to a set up of multiple heterogenous firm managers. Each manager can
implement a project with the same net present value in the first best ((θ + φ) π − I) but that
differs in the marginal cost of overinvesting in capital n. We consider a population of managers of
measure N who are continuously and uniformly distributed with n ∈ [N1, N2] and N2 −N1 = N.
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Finally, there is a population of measure N of perfectly competitive lenders, each with an inital
endowment of I, so that all the demand for credit by the managers can be met.
Figures 6 and 7, which depict aggregate welfare and bankruptcy rates as functions of the
creditor rights under bankruptcy, show the main results. In this section we provide the intuition
behind the findings, relegating the full characterisation to Appendix E.
Figure 6: welfare when n ≤ 1−θ
θ
αF ∀ n ∼ U [N1, N2]
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When creditor rights in bankruptcy are lower than the optimal ( B <  ⇤B) managers can only
implement the project under foreclosure because any contract under bankruptcy is unfeasible, as
stated in Lemma 3, implying that the bankruptcy rate is zero and welfare is at the low level ⌦1.
When creditor rights in bankruptcy are equal to the optimal ( B =  ⇤B), some managers stick
to foreclosure even though now bankruptcy is available, while those with projects with relatively
higher costs of overinvesting in capital switch from foreclosure to bankruptcy, as they obtain a
higher payoff with the latter. This is the case in which welfare and the bankruptcy rate are the
highest (⌦2 and BR2, respectively). As creditor rights increase within the region  B >  ⇤B, less
firms switch from foreclosure to bankruptcy, implying that welfare ⌦3 and bankruptcy rates BR3
decrease. These results are formally stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Welfare ⌦ is a non-monotonic function of the creditor control rights under
bankruptcy  B. It is maximum at their optimum level  ⇤B, it is ⌦1 for  B <  ⇤B, it is decreasing in
 B for  B >  ⇤B and it is ⌦1 for  B = 1. The bankruptcy rate BR is a non-monotonic function of
 B. It is maximum at  ⇤B, it is 0 for  B <  ⇤B, it is decreasing in  B for  B >  ⇤B and it is 0 for
 B = 1.
The model’s key result, that welfare is a non-monotonic function of the level of creditor control
rights in bankruptcy, has a direct policy implication: a perfectly “creditor-friendly” bankruptcy
code, i.e., one that always grants controls of the distressed firm to creditors ( B = 1), is very
inefficient. In fact, it is so inefficient that agents would never use it (i.e., the bankruptcy rate is
zero) as the alternative insolvency institution, foreclosure, leads to the same number of inefficient
liquidations but provides higher recovery rates to creditors and lower funding costs to firms.
A second result is that welfare is higher when the bankruptcy system is too “creditor- friendly”,
i.e., it ensures the provision of credit, but generates too many inefficient liquidations ( B >  ⇤B),
than when it is too “debtor-friendly” ( B <  ⇤B). In other words, if the optimal level of creditor
control rights in bankruptcy cannot be ascertained in practice, it may be better to grant too much
control of the bankruptcy process to creditors28 than too little, as the loss from undershooting that
28In practice, increasing creditor control rights can be achieved in different manners, such as letting creditors
take over the bankrupt firm (e.g. administration in the U.K.), actively involving them in the appointment of the
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level is larger than that from overshooting it.29 The reason why welfare is higher when  B >  ⇤B
than when  B <  ⇤B is that, when creditor rights exceed the optimal level, firms can choose between
two different insolvency institutions, bankruptcy and foreclosure, in other to maximise their payoffs.
However, when creditor rights are lower than the optimum, only one institution, foreclosure, can
be used. As bankruptcy and foreclosure are imperfect substitutes and firms prefer one insolvency
institution or the other depending on their marginal cost of overinvestment in capital, a too (but
not perfectly) “creditor-friendly” bankruptcy system yields higher welfare.
For completeness, Figures 8 and 9 summarise welfare and bankruptcy rates when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F ,
relegating its full characterisation to Appendix F. When n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F (the marginal cost of over-
investing in capital n is high vis-à-vis the efficiency of foreclosure’s liquidation technology ↵F )
the manager does not overinvest in capital when using foreclosure, implying that the choice of
insolvency institution does not depend on the marginal cost of overinvestment in capital. In that
scenario the manager chooses foreclosure over bankruptcy if the gains from lower funding costs
outweigh the higher probability of liquidation in case of default.30
As shown in Figure 8, the model’s key result also holds in this scenario: welfare is a non-
monotonic function of the creditor control rights in bankruptcy  B. Specifically, welfare is ⌦4 for
 B <  ⇤B, its maximum ⌦5 is achieved at  B =  ⇤B, it is ⌦6 ( B) with @⌦6@ B < 0 for the interval
( ⇤B,  B) and ⌦4 for the interval
⇥
 B, 1
⇤
. The policy implications are slightly different from the
previous case. While it is still true that a perfectly “creditor-friendly” bankruptcy code ( B = 1)
is very inefficient, the same holds for very “creditor-friendly” codes ( B    B). Hence, welfare is
insolvency administrators (along the lines of the German and Italian systems) and allowing them to propose a
liquidation plan -something that is forbidden in the French and Spanish bankruptcy codes, for instance- or even to
impose it.
29To illustrate this idea more formally remember that, according to Proposition 2, the optimal level of creditor
rights is  ⇤B =
I
✓ ⇡ . Suppose that (I, ✓, ,⇡) are not parameters but random variables, so that  
⇤
B is also a random
variable with expectation E [ ⇤B ]. If aggregate welfare ⌦( ) was a symmetric function about  ⇤B , then a risk-
neutral legislator should set  B = E [ ⇤B ]. However, as ⌦ ( B >  ⇤B) > ⌦ ( B <  ⇤B), then the legislator must set
 B = E [ ⇤B ] +   with   > 0 and E [ ⇤B ] +   < 1 =  F to reduce welfare losses.
30Specifically, the choice of insolvency institution depends on the values of the creditor control rights in bankruptcy
 B , the efficiency of foreclosure’s liquidation technology ↵F and the first-best liquidation value lˆ. For the depiction
of Figures 8 and 9 we have assumed  ⇤B  1  ↵F lˆ ⇡ to rule out a trivial case. If the optimal level of creditor rights in
bankruptcy is too high ( ⇤B > 1  ↵F lˆ ⇡ ), the manager always chooses foreclosure for any  B , as the gains from using
bankruptcy (less liquidations) are very low compared with the gains from using foreclosure (lower funding costs).
In such a case, both welfare and bankruptcy rates are independent of  B .
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weakly higher under a too “creditor friendly” bankruptcy system than under a too “debtor friendly”
one, implying that the loss from undershooting the optimal level of creditor rights may be larger
than that from overshooting it. With respect to the bankruptcy rate, as shown in Figure 9, it is
strictly positive for the interval
[
β∗B, βB) and zero elsewhere.
Figure 8: welfare when n > 1−θ
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A related implication comes from the joint inspection of Figures 6 and 7 and Figures 8 and
9, which show a positive correlation between bankruptcy rates and welfare: when bankruptcy
rates are high (low), welfare is high (low). This theoretical prediction seems corroborated by
the empirical evidence if we proxy welfare with per capita GDP (Claessens and Klapper, 2005;
Celentani et al., 2010). While there are a number of alternative explanations for the correlation
between bankruptcy rates and per capita GDP,31 the mechanism analysed in this paper may explain
part of such a correlation. Moreover, by showing that low bankruptcy rates may be associated with
low levels of welfare, the model explains why policymakers should look at bankruptcy rates in a way
that may seem counterintuitive: low bankruptcy rates are not always good news. More specifically,
if they suspect that the bankruptcy law does not provide enough protection to creditors, then it
makes sense to examine bankruptcy rates to determine if they are “too low” (for instance, by
international standards).
5 Discussion
Many papers have studied whether creditor-friendly or debtor-friendly corporate bankruptcy sys-
tems perform better in several aspects such as ex-ante incentives (provision of credit, efficient risk
taking) and ex-post outcomes (liquidation vs. reorganisation). However, the existing literature on
optimal bankruptcy seems to assume that the bankruptcy system is the only insolvency institution,
implying that, if private workouts fail -mainly because of coordination and asymmetric informa-
tion problems- bankruptcy is unavoidable. But this assumption does not seem to be warranted
by the empirical evidence, as many firms around the world resolve insolvency using other formal
procedures such as foreclosures.
This paper aims to fill this gap by modeling two insolvency institutions -bankruptcy and
foreclosure- that firms and their creditors may use when dealing with financial distress. Firms
choose between one institution and the other based on lenders’ willingness to provide credit and
the trade-off between two inefficiency costs, those of ex-ante productive inefficiencies and those
of ex-post inefficient liquidations. The trade-off occurs because firms may overinvest in capital to
31For instance, bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption may hamper both economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Sleiffer
and Vishny, 1993) and the use of the bankruptcy system by distressed firms.
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increase their assets’ liquidation value, which reduces funding costs. This overinvestment generates
productive inefficiencies but, by increasing the liquidation value, it reduces the cost of inefficient
liquidations (going concern value minus liquidation value).
The model’s key result is that welfare is a non-monotonic function of the level of creditor control
rights in bankruptcy. This result has a direct policy implication: a perfectly “creditor-friendly”
bankruptcy code, i.e., one that always grants controls of the distressed firm to creditors, is very
inefficient. In fact, it is so inefficient that agents in the model never use it because the alternative
insolvency institution, foreclosure, leads to the same number of inefficient liquidations but provides
higher recovery rates to creditors and lower funding costs to firms.
A second result is that welfare is higher when the bankruptcy system is too “creditor- friendly”,
i.e., it ensures the provision of credit, but generates too many inefficient liquidations, than when it
is too “debtor-friendly”. The intuition is that, as the optimal level of creditor control rights is the
minimum that makes the credit contract feasible under bankruptcy, when creditor rights exceed
the optimal level, the two insolvency institutions can be used, so that each firm chooses the one
that maximises its payoffs. However, when creditor rights are lower than the optimum, only one
institution, foreclosure, can be used. As bankruptcy and foreclosure are imperfect substitutes and
firms differ in their preferred insolvency institution, a too “creditor-friendly” bankruptcy system
may yield higher welfare. Hence, if the optimal level of creditor control rights in bankruptcy
cannot be ascertained in practice, it may be better to grant too much control of the bankruptcy
process to creditors than too little, as the loss from undershooting that level is larger than that
from overshooting it.
A related result is the positive correlation between welfare and bankruptcy rates: when creditor
rights are high (low), welfare is high (low) and bankruptcy rates are high (low). This theoreti-
cal prediction seems corroborated by the empirical evidence if we proxy welfare with per capita
GDP (Claessens and Klapper, 2005; Celentani et al., 2010). While there are a number of al-
ternative explanations for the correlation between bankruptcy rates and per capita GDP, the
mechanism analysed in this paper may explain part of such a correlation. Moreover, by showing
that low bankruptcy rates may be associated with low levels of welfare, the model warns that
low bankruptcy rates, such as those observed in the countries in Southern Europe32, may be the
32See Celentani et al. (2010) and García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014).
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symptom of a real malady. Hence, if policy makers suspect that the bankruptcy law does not
provide enough protection to creditors, then they should assess whether bankruptcy rates are “too
low” (for instance, by international standards).
This very stylised model can be extended in several dimensions that yield additional insights.
First, we may allow for some positive credit recovery in bankruptcy, i.e., 0 < ↵B < ↵F (see Ap-
pendix C). In that case  ⇤B depends on the technological parameter n, i.e.,  ⇤B (n). Specifically,
the higher the marginal cost of overinvesting in capital n, the more “creditor-friendly” the opti-
mal bankruptcy code should be, i.e., @ 
⇤
B
@n > 0. In practice, however, bankruptcy laws cannot be
individually tailored to firm characteristics such as technology. Suppose that firms are homoge-
neous in all dimensions except in their n and that the same  B must be applied to all firms. For
simplicity, assume that there are only two firms, with nH and nL such as nH > nL (high-cost and
low-cost, respectively). As @ 
⇤
B
@n > 0,  
⇤
B (nH) >  
⇤
B (nL). If  B    ⇤B (nH), then both firms can use
bankruptcy, but it leads to too many inefficient liquidations for the low-cost firm. By contrast,
if  ⇤B (nH) >  B    ⇤B (nL), then only the low-cost firm can use bankruptcy, while the high-cost
firm needs to use foreclosure, even though foreclosure is not well-suited to firms with high costs of
overinvesting in capital. A social planner, when setting the bankruptcy code  B, must take into
account these trade-offs in order to maximise the total welfare created by the two firms.
A second extension is to include firm size in the model, as the available evidence shows that small
firms rarely file for bankruptcy and rely in alternative debt-enforcements mechanisms (Claessens
and Klapper, 2005; Morrison, 2008, 2009; García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014). While
there are several potential explanations for this phenomenon (low coordination costs because of few
creditors, low asymmetric information problems due to “relationship lending”) probably the most
uncontroversial observation is that bankruptcy procedures are expensive and that a substantial
part of the costs are fixed. 33 Hence we may assume that the firm’s project requires an initial
outay I 2 (0,+1) and yields cash-flows ⇡I   n(l  lˆ) (with l =  I) at t = 1 and ⇡I at t = 2. The
probabilities of project success, as well as other features, are the same as in the basic model. The
33 According to Bris et al. (2006) and their large sample of bankruptcies in the U.S., among firms with assets
worth less than $ 100,000, the median direct costs burn 23.2% of asset value. Among firms with assets worth
between $ 100,000 and $ 1 million, the median direct costs consume 4.9% of asset value.
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only other departure from that model is that the lender must pay a cost K > 0 for the bankruptcy
procedure to take place. K is fixed, i.e., it does not depend on the firm’s size I. Solving the model34
it can be shown that @ 
⇤
B
@I < 0, i.e., the larger the firm, the lower the optimal creditor control rights
in bankruptcy. Suppose, for simplicity, only two firms with size IS and IL with IL > IS (small and
large, respectively). Since @ 
⇤
B
@I < 0 then  
⇤
B (IL) <  
⇤
B (IS). If the actual bankruptcy code  B is
 ⇤B (IL)   B <  ⇤B (IS), then bankruptcy is only feasible for the large firm, implying that, while
that firm can choose between bankruptcy and foreclosure to maximise its profits, the small firm has
to obtain credit through the foreclosure system, even if it found more profitable to use bankruptcy
(i.e., if its cost of overinvestment in capital n is quite high). By contrast, if the bankruptcy code
 B is  B    ⇤B (IS) >  ⇤B (IL), then bankruptcy is also feasible for the small firm, implying that
both firms are able to choose between bankruptcy and foreclosure to maximise its profits. Hence, a
“too-creditor friendly” bankruptcy system ( B    ⇤B (IS)) allows for more insolvency options than
a “too-debtor friendly” one ( B <  ⇤B (IS)), in analogous fashion to the findings of the base model.
Nevertheless, the present analysis assumes away an important factor in the optimal design of
bankruptcy laws and, especifically, its degree of “creditor friendliness”: the efficient allocation of risk
between risk neutral creditors and risk averse entrepreneurs and small firms. When the distressed
business is a large limited liability firm, the assumption of risk-neutrality is quite plausible but,
in the case of an entrepreneur who has unlimited liability, risk aversion seems more appropriate.
The same may hold for small corporate firms because lenders often require personal guarantees or
security in the form of a second mortgage on the owner’s home, which wipes out the owner’s limited
liability (Berkowitz andWhite, 2004). As a consequence, those businesses often use personal, rather
than corporate, bankruptcy. The optimal degree of “creditor friendliness” of personal bankruptcy
mainly depends on the trade-off between two effects. On the one hand, creditor-friendly personal
bankruptcy laws minimise the scope for moral hazard and they may in turn reduce the risk premium
charged to entrepreneurs and facilitate their access to credit (the “credit supply effect”). On the
other hand, debtor-friendly laws (i.e., those that allow a “fresh start” or set high exemption levels)
provide partial insurance against business failure (the “insurance effect”), which may incentive
risk-averse agents to undertake entrepreneurial activities. The available evidence suggests that the
second effect dominates the first one [Fan and White (2003), Armour and Cumming (2008), Fossen
34See Supplement C.
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(2014)], implying that at least some features of debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws are desirable in
order to promote entrepreneurship.35
For future research, we could study whether some insolvency frameworks favour industries with
low NPV but low cost of overinvesting in capital at the expense of deterring others with higher
NPV but higher costs of overinvestment. By doing so we would analyse the “extensive margin”
of the overinvestment in capital, rather than its “intensive margin”, as done in the present model.
This may have practical implications. For instance, according to Banco de España (2010) and
Arce et al. (2013), in Spain the less productive sectors such as construction would have benefited
from the strong credit growth between 1995 and 2007, one of the reasons being that those sectors
produce assets that can be used as collateral on loans.36
35However, the impact of personal bankruptcy laws on innovation is less clear. Cerqueiro et al. (2014) find that
debtor-friendly laws hamper innovation due to the reduction in the credit supply to inventors and small firms. By
contrast, Armour (2004) argues that too creditor-friendly laws may deter venture capital and, in turn, innovation,
because he finds a negative correlation between the degree of “creditor friendliness” and venture capital, which
attributes to the lower demand for venture capital by entrepreneurs in countries where personal bankruptcy is more
creditor-friendly.
36Another paper close in spirit to these ideas is that of Araujo and Minetti (2011).
30
6 Appendix A: proof of l   lˆ
In solving all the paper’s maximisation programs we have used the fact that l   lˆ, which simplifies
D(l) to D(l) = n
⇣
l   lˆ
⌘
.
The reason why l   lˆ is the following. The manager may have incentives to deviate from
the optimal proportion of capital, hence incurring in productive inefficiencies, if by doing so she
increases the project’s liquidation value l and consequently the recovery rate of the lender in the
event of default, which decreases the required repayment R. This mechanism can be observed from
the inspection of the lender’s payoff function in the case of non-strategic default, recalling that he
is perfectly competitive:
✓R + (1  ✓)  ↵l   I = 0
From the above equation one can see that a higher value of l yields, ceteris paribus, a lower
value of R. Moreover, the manager would never choose a proportion of capital such that l < lˆ,
because she would incurr in productive inefficiencies with cost D(l) > D(l = lˆ) = 0 and she would
also have a higher funding cost R than if choosing l = lˆ. Thus, the only relevant cases are the ones
in which l   lˆ.
7 Appendix B: proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proposition 1. The optimal contract {R⇤,  ⇤, l⇤} in the case of distress resolution via a private
workout is:
(i) If 0 < ↵  1. R⇤ =  ⇡ ⇤,  ⇤ = Iq
I ⇡(1 ✓)↵
✓n
, l⇤ =
q
I ⇡
✓(1 ✓)n↵   ✓ ⇡(1 ✓)↵ . The contract is feasible
if I 2
h
✓3 n⇡
(1 ✓)↵ ,
(1 ✓)↵ ⇡
✓n
i
.
(ii) If ↵ = 0. R⇤ = I✓ , 
⇤ = I✓ ⇡ , l
⇤ = lˆ.
Proof. We use the result of Appendix A, according to which l   lˆ, so that D(l) can be rewritten
as D(l) = n
⇣
l   lˆ
⌘
. Let us start with the proof of (i). First, notice that the individual rationality
constraint of the lender (2) is binding at the optimum because he is perfectly competitive. Suppose
to the contrary that (2) is slack. In such a case lowering R would increase EU because @EU@R < 0 and
31
it would make (1) and (3) hold a fortiori. Second, notice that the incentive compatibility constraint
of the manager (1) is also binding at the optimum. Suppose to the contrary that (1) is slack. In
such a case we could lower   to  0 =     " where " > 0. To keep (2) binding we need to increase
R to R0 = R + 1 ✓✓ ↵l". The old utility is V0 ⌘ ✓
h
⇡   n(l   lˆ) R +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓) (1   ) ⇡.
The new utility is V1 ⌘ ✓
h
⇡   n(l   lˆ)   R + 1 ✓✓ ↵l" +  ⇡i + (1  ✓) [1  (    ")] ⇡. The new
utility is higher than the old utility because V1   V0 > 0 ()   (1  ✓)↵l"+ (1  ✓) ⇡" > 0 ()
 ⇡ > ↵l which is true by assumption. Therefore, (1) cannot be slack at the optimum since there
would be a pair  0, R0 that would increase the manager’s utility without violating the lender’s
individual rationality constraint. Third, the first feasibility constraint (3) does not bind, so we
can ignore it. To see that, rearrange (3): R + n(l   lˆ)  ⇡. As lowering both R and l increases
EU and it makes (3) hold a fortiori, (3) does not bind.37 Combining (1) and (2) we can express
the liquidation probability   and the repayment R as functions of the liquidation value l, i.e.,
 (l) = I✓ ⇡+(1 ✓)↵l and R(l) =
I ⇡
✓ ⇡+(1 ✓)↵l . Plugging those expressions into the manager’s utility
and the remaining constraint (4) we have the following maximisation problem:
max
l
EU = ✓
h
⇡   n(l   lˆ)
i
+  ⇡   I ⇡
✓ ⇡ + (1  ✓)↵l
s.t.:
I  ✓ ⇡ + (1  ✓)↵l (6)
Since I  ✓ ⇡ and l   0 by construction, (6) is always satisfied for any value of l, so we
can ignore it as well. We then face an unconstrained maximisation program, whose solutions are
l =   ✓ ⇡(1 ✓)↵ ±
q
I ⇡
✓(1 ✓)n↵ . However, since l   0, we can rule out the negative root, so the unique
solution is l⇤ =
q
I ⇡
✓(1 ✓)n↵  ✓ ⇡(1 ✓)↵ . Plugging l⇤ into the above expressions for  (l) and R(l) we find
 ⇤ = Iq
I ⇡(1 ✓)↵
✓n
and R⇤ =  ⇡ ⇤. By differentianting EU twice with respect to l we find @2EU@l2 < 0,
37 But we also need to check that, if (3) is not binding, i.e., R + n(l   lˆ) < ⇡, the lender’s individual rationality
constraint (2) still holds. Rearrange (2): R   1✓ [I   (1  ✓) ↵l]. Putting together the two conditions: 1✓ [I  
(1  ✓) ↵l]  R < ⇡   n(l   lˆ). This holds as long as ⇡   n(l   lˆ) > 1✓ [I   (1  ✓) ↵l], which can be rearranged
to ⇡   I✓ + nlˆ   l
⇥
n  1 ✓✓  ↵
⇤
. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for that is n  1 ✓✓  ↵; in that case, as
I  ✓ ⇡ and l   0 the condition is always satisfied because its RHS 0 and its LHS  0.
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i.e, the function is concave and EU (l⇤) is its maximum. Finally, for the contract to be feasible
we need: 0   ⇤  1 (I); l⇤   0 (II); R⇤   0 (III). While any parameter value satifies (III), we
need I  (1 ✓)↵ ⇡✓n to make (I) hold and I   ✓
3 n⇡
(1 ✓)↵ to make (II) hold. Putting these two conditions
together, what we need is I 2
h
✓3 n⇡
(1 ✓)↵ ,
(1 ✓)↵ ⇡
✓n
i
(which is not an empty set as long as n < 1 ✓✓2 ↵).
For the proof of (ii), we again make use of the fact that the individual rationality constraint
of the lender (2) and the incentive compatibility constraint of the manager (1) are binding at the
optimum. Because ↵ = 0, l disappears from (2), implying that (1) and (2) make up a system of
two equations and two unknowns, R and  , whose solutions are  ⇤ = I✓ ⇡ and R
⇤ = I✓ . Plugging
those expressions into the manager’s utility and the remaining constraints we have the following
maximisation problem:
max
l
EU = ✓
h
⇡   n(l   lˆ)
i
+  ⇡   I
✓
s.t.:h
⇡   n(l   lˆ)
i
  I
✓
  0 (7)
I  ✓ ⇡ (8)
Since @EU@l < 0 and a low l makes (7) easier to hold, we have a corner solution: l
⇤ = lˆ. Plugging
l⇤ = lˆ into (7) and rearranging it becomes I  ✓⇡. As I  ✓ ⇡, (8) is satisfied by construction
while (7) is satisfied because 0 <   < 1. Finally, for the contract to be feasible we need: 0   ⇤  1
(I); l⇤   0 (II); R⇤   0 (III). Any parameter value satifies (II) and (III) and (I) always holds as
we have assumed I  ✓ ⇡.
Lemma 3.  ⇤B is the minimum level of creditor rights in bankruptcy that makes the lender
provide credit. If  B <  ⇤B, then the contract is not feasible under the bankruptcy institution.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 1 we found that the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint
(1) was binding at the optimum. As the manager’s maximisation problem for bankruptcy is the
same as the one for private workouts when ↵ = 0, the constraint is:  ⇤B ⇡ = RB. If  B <  ⇤B,
then  B ⇡ < RB, i.e., the incentive-compatibility constraint is violated. The only way we could
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make the constraint hold again would be lowering RB. However, in the proof of Proposition 1 we
found that the individual rationality constraint of the lender (2) was also binding at the optimum,
so that R⇤B = I✓ is both the optimal and the minimum feasible repayment and we cannot lower RB
below that value without violating the constraint.
Proposition 4. If  B >  ⇤B, then the contract is feasible under the bankruptcy institution. In
that case the optimal contract {R⇤⇤B , l⇤⇤B } is given by R⇤⇤B = I✓ ,l⇤⇤B = lˆ. The equilibrium welfare is
W ⇤⇤B = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)  B ⇡
Proof. We use the result of Appendix A, according to which l   lˆ, so that D(l) can be rewritten as
D(l) = n
⇣
l   lˆ
⌘
. The optimal contract under non-optimal bankruptcy ( B >  ⇤B) maximises the
manager’s expected utility EUB subject to the following constraints: (9) the manager’s incentive
compatibility; (10) the lender’s individual rationality; (11) the repayment cannot exceed the cash
flow at t = 1 in the good state of nature.
max
RB ,lB
EUB = ✓
h
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   B) ⇡
s.t.:
 B ⇡   RB (9)
✓RB   I (10)
RB  ⇡   n(lB   lˆ) (11)
First, notice that the lender’s individual rationality constraint (10) is binding at the optimum.
Suppose to the contrary that (10) is slack. In such a case lowering RB would increase EUB
because @EUB@RB <0 and it would make (9) and (11) hold a fortiori. Hence R
⇤⇤
B =
I
✓ . Since
@EU
@lB
< 0
and lowering lB makes (11) hold a fortiori, we have l⇤⇤B = lˆ. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3,
 ⇤B ⇡ = RB, which implies that  B >  ⇤B makes the incentive compatibility constraint be slack.
Plugging R⇤⇤B into that constraint we have  B ⇡ > I✓ . Rearranging it we find a constraint for
the initial outlay I: I <  B✓ ⇡. Another constraint for I arises from plugging R⇤⇤B and l⇤⇤B into
(11) and rearranging: I  ✓⇡. Since 0   B  1 and 0 <   < 1, if I <  B✓ ⇡ holds, then
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I  ✓⇡ must also hold, so we can ignore the latter. To see that I <  B✓ ⇡ holds recall that we
have  B >  ⇤B = I✓ ⇡ , which satisfies the constraint by construction. Finally, plugging R
⇤⇤
B =
I
✓
and l⇤⇤B = lˆ into the manager’s expected utility and using the fact the lender breaks even we find
W ⇤⇤B = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)  B ⇡.
Proposition 5. The optimal contract {R⇤F , l⇤F} and the equilibrium welfare W ⇤F under fore-
closure when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F are:
l⇤F = I, R⇤F =
I (1 ✓)↵F I
✓ , W
⇤
F = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓) [ ⇡   ↵F I]  ✓n(I   lˆ).
Proof. We use the result of Appendix A, according to which l   lˆ, so that D(l) can be rewritten
as D(l) = n
⇣
l   lˆ
⌘
. The optimal contract maximises the manager’s expected utility EUF sub-
ject to the following constraints: (12) manager’s incentive compatibility; (13) lender’s individual
rationality; (14) the repayment cannot exceed the cash flow at t = 1 in the good state of nature
(feasibility constraint).
max
RF ,lF
EUF = ✓
h
⇡   n(lF   lˆ) RF +  ⇡
i
s.t.:
⇡   n(lF   lˆ) RF +  ⇡   ⇡   n(lF   lˆ) (12)
✓RF + (1  ✓)↵F lF   I (13)
RF  ⇡   n(lF   lˆ) (14)
First, the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (12) is not binding at the optimum.
Too see this, simplify and rearrange (12) to obtain RF   ⇡. Since @EUF@RF < 0 and by lowering
RF (14) holds a fortiori, one would like to decrease RF as much as possible to increase EUF ,
which implies that (12) is not binding. But we also need to check that, if (12) is not binding,
i.e., RF <  ⇡, the lender’s individual rationality constraint (13) still holds. Rearrange (13):
RF   1✓ [I   (1  ✓)↵F lF ]. Putting together the two conditions: 1✓ [I   (1  ✓)↵F lF ]  RF <  ⇡.
This holds as long as  ⇡ > 1✓ [I  (1  ✓)↵F lF ], which is true because I  ✓ ⇡ and lF   0. Second,
35
the feasibility constraint (14) is not binding at the optimum. To see this, rearrange (14) to obtain
RF +n(lF   lˆ)  ⇡. Since @EUF@RF < 0 and @EUF@lF < 0 and by lowering RF and lF (14) holds a fortiori,
one would like to decrease RF and lF as much as possible to increase EUF , which implies that (14)
is not binding. But we also need to check that, if (14) is not binding, i.e., RF + n(lF   lˆ) < ⇡, the
lender’s individual rationality constraint (13) still holds. Rearrange (13): RF   1✓ [I (1  ✓)↵F lF ].
Putting together the two conditions: 1✓ [I (1  ✓)↵F lF ]  RF < ⇡ n(lF  lˆ). This holds as long as
⇡ n(lF  lˆ) > 1✓ [I (1  ✓)↵F lF ], which can be rearranged to⇡  I✓+nlˆ   lF
⇥
n  1 ✓✓ ↵F
⇤
. Because
n  1 ✓✓ ↵F , I  ✓ ⇡ and lF   0 the previous condition is always satisfied, as its RHS 0 and
its LHS  0. Third, the lender’s individual rationality constraint (13) is binding at the optimum.
Suppose to the contrary that (13) is slack. In such a case lowering RF and lF would increase EUF ,
since @EUF@RF < 0 and
@EUF
@lF
< 0, and it would make (12) and (14) hold a fortiori. Now rearrange
(13) to find the repayment cost as function of the liquidation value: RF = I (1 ✓)↵F lF✓ . Plugging
this expression into EUF and knowing that (12) and (14) are not binding, we have the following
unconstrained maximisation program:
max
lF
EUF = ✓
h
⇡   n(lF   lˆ)  I (1 ✓)↵F lF✓ +  ⇡
i
Differentiating EUF with respect to lF we have @EUF@lF =  ✓n + (1  ✓)↵F . The sign of the
derivative depends on the relative value of n vis-à-vis ↵F . As we have imposed n < 1 ✓✓ ↵F , we
have @EUF@lF >0 and a corner solution: l
⇤
F = I. Plugging l⇤F into (13) we find R⇤F =
I (1 ✓)↵F I
✓ .
Plugging those solutions into the manager’s expected utility and using the fact that the lender
breaks even we find the equilibrium welfare.
Proposition 6. Welfare ⌦ is a non-monotonic function of the creditor control rights under
bankruptcy  B. It is maximum at their optimum level  ⇤B, it is ⌦1 for  B <  ⇤B, it is decreasing in
 B for  B >  ⇤B and it is ⌦1 for  B = 1. The bankruptcy rate BR is a non-monotonic function of
 B. It is maximum at  ⇤B, it is 0 for  B <  ⇤B, it is decreasing in  B for  B >  ⇤B and it is 0 for
 B = 1.
Proof. See Apendix E.
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8 Appendix C: analysis when ↵B > 0
The aim of this section is to show that the model’s results do not change qualitatively when we
relax the assumption ↵B = 0 and we allow for some positive credit recovery under bankruptcy, i.e.,
↵B > 0. Specifically, under bankruptcy the level of overinvestment in capital is (weakly) lower,
i.e., l⇤B  l⇤F , as well as the probability of inefficient liquidations, i.e.,  ⇤B   ⇤F .
8.1 Optimal contract under bankruptcy and optimal bankruptcy code
In the baseline model, where ↵B = 0, the optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B does not depend on
the marginal cost from productive inefficiencies n. If ↵B > 0 this is no longer the case. The
maximisation program to find the optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B, together with the optimal contract
{R⇤B, l⇤B}, is the following:
max
RB , B ,lB
EUB = ✓
h
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   B) ⇡
s.t.:
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡   ⇡   n(lB   lˆ) + (1   B) ⇡ (15)
✓RB + (1  ✓) B↵BlB   I (16)
RB  ⇡   n(lB   lˆ) (17)
0   B  1 (18)
lB   lˆ (19)
As the above program is identical to that of the base model (distress resolution via private
workouts), we refer the reader to the proof of Proposition 1. The results are summarised in
Proposition C1.
Proposition C1. The optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B and the optimal contract {R⇤B, l⇤B} when
↵B > 0 are:
 ⇤B =
Iq
I ⇡(1 ✓)↵B
✓n
;R⇤B =  ⇡ 
⇤
B ; l⇤B =
q
I ⇡
✓(1 ✓)n↵B   ✓ ⇡(1 ✓)↵B . The contract is feasible if I 2h
✓3 n⇡
(1 ✓)↵B ,
(1 ✓)↵B ⇡
✓n
i
.
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A couple of remarks are worth making regarding the optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B. First,  ⇤B
depends on the technological parameter n, which implies that the bankruptcy code is firm/industry
specific. Second, the higher the marginal cost of overinvesting in capital n, the more “creditor-
friendly” the optimal bankruptcy code should be (i.e., @ 
⇤
B
@n > 0). In practice, however, bankruptcy
laws cannot be individually tailored to firm characteristics such as technology. Suppose, as in
section 4, that firms are homogeneous in all dimensions except for their marginal cost of overin-
vesting in capital n and that the same  B must be applied to all firms. For simplicity of exposition,
assume that there are only two firms, with nH and nL such as nH > nL (high-cost and low-cost,
respectively). As @ 
⇤
B
@n > 0,  
⇤
B (nH) >  
⇤
B (nL). If  B >  ⇤B (nH), then both firms can use the
bankruptcy system. By contrast, if  ⇤B (nH) >  B >  ⇤B (nL), then only the low-cost firm can use
the bankruptcy system, while the high-cost firm needs to use foreclosure. In setting the bankruptcy
code  B a social planner must maximise the total welfare created by the two firms. It is straight-
forward to show that one of two outcomes is optimal from a social planner’s perspective, either
 B =  ⇤B (nH) (both firms can use bankruptcy, but it leads to too many inefficient liquidations for
the low-cost firm) or  B =  ⇤B (nL) (only the low-cost firm can use bankruptcy, which is its optimal
bankruptcy procedure).38
Comparing bankruptcy and foreclosure, we find that  ⇤B   F = 1, i.e., the liquidation proba-
bility is lower in bankruptcy than in foreclosure. Too see this notice that the optimal liquidation
probability can be expressed as a function of the optimal liquidation value:  ⇤B = I✓ ⇡+(1 ✓)↵B l⇤B .
Since I  ✓ ⇡ by assumption, l⇤B   lˆ > 0 and ↵B > 0, then  ⇤B < 1 =  F . With respect to the
level of overinvestment in capital under bankruptcy, it is (weakly) lower than under foreclosure by
construction, as l⇤B 2
h
lˆ, I
i
(the higher n, the lower l⇤B) while we know that l⇤F = I when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F
(Proposition 5) and that l⇤⇤F = lˆ when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F (Appendix F).
38A similar conclusion is found in Ayotte and Yun (2009), although they study the heterogeneity in the project’s
NPV and the choice between bankruptcy and private workouts.
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8.2 Optimal contracts under non-optimal bankruptcy code
8.2.1 Optimal contracts
The maximisation program to find the optimal contract for any bankruptcy code such that  B >  ⇤B
is the following:
max
RB ,lB
EUB = ✓
h
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   B) ⇡
s.t.:
 B ⇡   RB (20)
✓RB + (1  ✓) B↵BlB   I (21)
RB  ⇡   n(lB   lˆ) (22)
lB   lˆ (23)
This maximisation program is the generalisation of that for the foreclosure institution (see
proof of Proposition 5) in which the liquidation probability  B is not necessarily 1. Thus we follow
the same strategy to solve it. The optimal contracts are summarised in Proposition C2.
Proposition C2. The equilibrium contracts under bankruptcy for any bankruptcy code such
that  B >  ⇤B are:
a) For n  1 ✓✓  B↵B: l⇤B = I, R⇤B = I (1 ✓) B↵BI✓ .
b) For n > 1 ✓✓  B↵B : l
⇤⇤
B = lˆ, R⇤⇤B =
I (1 ✓) B↵B lˆ
✓ .
8.2.2 Overinvestment: bankruptcy vs. foreclosure
As displayed in Proposition C2, unlike in the case with ↵B = 0, there is overinvestment in capital
for some values of n. However, such overinvestment occurs for less (lower) values of n than in the
case of foreclosure, i.e., there is less overinvestment.
In the case of bankruptcy: l⇤B = I for n  1 ✓✓  B↵B and l⇤⇤B = lˆ for n > 1 ✓✓  B↵B. In the case of
foreclosure: l⇤F = I for n  1 ✓✓ ↵F (see Proposition 5) and l⇤⇤F = lˆ for n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F (see Appendix F).
The fact that  B  1 and ↵B < ↵F implies 1 ✓✓  B↵B < 1 ✓✓ ↵F , which means that overinvestment
under bankruptcy (l⇤B = I) takes place for less (lower) values of n than under foreclosure (l⇤F = I).
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The intuition is straightforward. Overinvesting in capital reduces funding costs at the expense
of costs of productive inefficiencies. The funding costs, as a function of the liquidation value,
are RB = I (1 ✓) B↵B lB✓ under bankruptcy and RF =
I (1 ✓)↵F lF
✓ under foreclosure. Since
@RB
@lB
=
 1 ✓✓  B↵B while @RF@lF =  1 ✓✓ ↵F and ↵B < ↵F ,  B  1, the marginal benefit of overinvesting in
capital (i.e., the marginal reduction in funding costs) is higher in the case of foreclosure, while its
marginal cost, n, is the same for both institutions. The same intuition applies, a fortiori, to the
case of optimal bankruptcy, as  ⇤B <  B.
9 Appendix D: choice of insolvency institution when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F
9.1  B <  ⇤B
If  B <  ⇤B then the project cannot be undertaken under bankruptcy, as expressed in Lemma 3,
so it will be carried out under foreclosure.
9.2  B =  ⇤B
If  B =  ⇤B then the manager chooses foreclosure iff W ⇤F   W ⇤B which, by simple algebraic manip-
ulation of the equilibrium welfares in Propositions 2 and 5, amounts to:
n  (1 ✓)[
I
✓+↵F I  ⇡]
✓(I lˆ)
As we are in the scenario n  1 ✓✓ ↵F and
(1 ✓)[ I✓+↵F I  ⇡]
✓(I lˆ) may be greater than
1 ✓
✓ ↵F for
sufficiently high values of I (especifically, if I   ✓ ⇡   ✓↵F lˆ ) the value of n that makes the
manager indifferent between foreclosure and bankruptcy is n¯ ⌘ min
⇢
(1 ✓)[ I✓+↵F I  ⇡]
✓(I lˆ) ,
1 ✓
✓ ↵F
 
. In
other words, the manager chooses foreclosure if n 2 [0, n¯] and bankruptcy if n 2  n¯, 1 ✓✓ ↵F ⇤.
For n¯ to be feasible we need to check that n¯   0. As 1 ✓✓ ↵F > 0 by construction, we only
need to check that (1 ✓)[
I
✓+↵F I  ⇡]
✓(I lˆ)   0. That inequality is equivalent to ↵F    ⇡I   1✓ , which
can be rewritten, for its interpretation, as ↵F I   (1   ⇤B) ⇡, i.e., the liquidation proceedings in
foreclosure are greater than the expected continuation cash-flows in optimal bankruptcy. Recalling
that 0 < ↵F  1, we need to check that  ⇡I   1✓  1, so there may exist a sufficiently high ↵F  1
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that satisfies ↵F    ⇡I   1✓ . As  ⇡I   1✓  1 is equivalent to I   ✓ ⇡1+✓ , the necessary condition for
↵F    ⇡I   1✓ to hold is I   ✓ ⇡1+✓ . In sum, n¯ is feasible if ↵F    ⇡I   1✓ and I   ✓ ⇡1+✓ .
9.3 1 >  B >  ⇤B
If  B >  ⇤B then the manager chooses foreclosure iff W ⇤F   W ⇤⇤B which, by simple algebraic
manipulation of the equilibrium welfares in Propositions 4 and 5, is equivalent to:
n  (1 ✓)[↵F I  ⇡(1  B)]
✓(I lˆ)
As we are in the scenario n  1 ✓✓ ↵F and (1 ✓)[↵F I  ⇡(1  B)]✓(I lˆ) may be greater than 1 ✓✓ ↵F for
sufficiently high values of  B (e.g.  B = 1), the value of n that makes the manager indifferent
between foreclosure and bankruptcy is en = minn (1 ✓)[↵F I  ⇡(1  B)]
✓(I lˆ) ,
1 ✓
✓ ↵F
o
. In other words, the
manager chooses foreclosure if n 2 [0, en] and bankruptcy if n 2  en, 1 ✓✓ ↵F ⇤. It can be shown thaten   n¯, i.e., there are more values for which the manager chooses foreclosure over bankruptcy when
bankruptcy is not optimal, simply because W ⇤⇤B  W ⇤B.
For en to be feasible we need to check that en   0, so the interval [0, en] for which foreclosure is cho-
sen is not empty. As 1 ✓✓ ↵F > 0 by construction, we only need to check that
(1 ✓)[↵F I  ⇡(1  B)]
✓(I lˆ)   0.
That inequality is equivalent to ↵F I   (1   B) ⇡, i.e., the liquidation proceedings in foreclosure
are greater than the expected continuation cash-flows in non-optimal bankruptcy. Rewriting that
expression as ↵F    ⇡I (1   B), we need to check that  ⇡I (1   B)  1, so there may exist a suffi-
ciently high ↵F  1 that satisfies the condition. Since  ⇡I (1   B)  1 is equivalent to  B   1  I ⇡ ,
we need to check that its RHS is lower than 1 for a sufficiently high  B  1 to be able to satisfy
it. Notice that it is always the case because I ⇡ > 0. In sum, en is feasible if ↵F    ⇡I (1   B).
9.4  B = 1
If  B = 1 then the manager always chooses foreclosure becauseW ⇤F   W ⇤⇤B if n  en and en = 1 ✓✓ ↵F
when  B = 1.
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10 Appendix E: full characterisation of welfare and bankruptcy rates when n 
1 ✓
✓ ↵F
If  B <  ⇤B no project can be undertaken under bankruptcy, as expressed in Lemma 3, so all of them
are carried out under foreclosure. Hence the corresponding bankruptcy rate BR1 ⌘ BR ( B <  ⇤B)
is zero and the aggregate welfare ⌦1 is computed using Proposition 5:
⌦1 ⌘ ⌦ ( B <  ⇤B) =
´ N2
N1
W ⇤Fdn =
´ N2
N1
n
(✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓) [ ⇡   ↵F I]  ✓n(I   lˆ)
o
dn
If  B =  ⇤B we know from the analysis in section 3 that the projects with n 2 [N1, n¯] are
undertaken under foreclosure and the projects with n 2 (n¯, N2] are implemented under bankruptcy.
The corresponding bankruptcy rate is BR2 ⌘ BR ( B =  ⇤B) = (1  ✓) N2 n¯N , since a proportion
N2 n¯
N of managers use the bankruptcy system and default with probability (1  ✓). The aggregate
welfare ⌦2 is computed using propositions 2 and 5:
⌦2 ⌘ ⌦ ( B =  ⇤B) =
´ n¯
N1
W ⇤Fdn+
´ N2
n¯ W
⇤
Bdn =
´ n¯
N1
{(✓ +  ) ⇡  I  (1  ✓) [ ⇡   ↵F I] ✓n(I 
lˆ)}dn+
+
´ N2
n {(✓ +  ) ⇡   I   1 ✓✓ I}dn
If  B >  ⇤B we know from the analysis in section 3 that the projects with n 2 [N1, en] are
undertaken under foreclosure and the projects with n 2 (en,N2] are implemented under bankruptcy.
The corresponding bankruptcy rate is BR3 ⌘ BR ( B >  ⇤B) = (1  ✓) N2 enN , since a proportion
N2 en
N of managers use the bankruptcy system and default with probability (1  ✓) . The aggregate
welfare ⌦3 is computed using propositions 4 and 5:
⌦3 ⌘ ⌦ ( B >  ⇤B) =
´ n˜
N1
W ⇤Fdn+
´ N2en W ⇤⇤B dn =
=
´ en
N1
n
(✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓) [ ⇡   ↵F I]  ✓n(I   lˆ)
o
dn+
´ N2en {(✓ +  ) ⇡ I (1  ✓)  B ⇡}dn
These results are represented in figures 6 and 7 (see section 4 of the main text).
Proposition 6. Welfare ⌦ is a non-monotonic function of the creditor control rights under
bankruptcy  B. It is maximum at their optimum level  ⇤B, it is ⌦1 for  B <  ⇤B, it is decreasing in
 B for  B >  ⇤B and it is ⌦1 for  B = 1. The bankruptcy rate BR is a non-monotonic function of
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 B. It is maximum at  ⇤B, it is 0 for  B <  ⇤B, it is decreasing in  B for  B >  ⇤B and it is 0 for
 B = 1.
Proof. The results summarised in Proposition 6 come from the analysis of the values for welfare
and the bankruptcy rate that were found in the first part of this Appendix: {⌦1,⌦2,⌦3} and
{BR1, BR2, BR3}. To prove that ⌦( B) is a non-monotonic function of  ⇤B it is sufficient to prove
that ⌦1 < ⌦3 < ⌦2 when  B < 1. To see that ⌦1 < ⌦3 (i), rewrite ⌦1 =
´ n˜
N1
W ⇤Fdn+
´ N2
n˜ W
⇤
Fdn and
compare it with ⌦3 =
´ n˜
N1
W ⇤Fdn+
´ N2en W ⇤⇤B dn. Because W ⇤F < W ⇤⇤B when n >en (see Appendix D)
we have
´ N2
n˜ W
⇤
Fdn <
´ N2en W ⇤⇤B dn. To see that ⌦3 < ⌦2 (ii), rewrite ⌦3 = ´ n˜N1 W ⇤Fdn+ ´ n˜n¯ W ⇤Fdn+´ N2en W ⇤⇤B dn and compare it with ⌦2 = ´ n¯N1 W ⇤Fdn + ´ N2n¯ W ⇤Bdn. Because W ⇤F < W ⇤B when n >n¯
(see Appendix D) and W ⇤⇤B < W ⇤B, we have
´ n˜
n¯ W
⇤
Fdn +
´ N2en W ⇤⇤B dn <´ N2n¯ W ⇤Bdn. Putting to-
gether (i) and (ii) we have ⌦1 < ⌦3 < ⌦2. To prove that BR( B) is a non-monotonic function
of  ⇤B it is sufficient to prove that BR1 < BR3 < BR2 when  B < 1, which is straightforward
to show as en > n. To prove that ⌦ ( B <  ⇤B) = ⌦ ( B = 1) = ⌦1 if  B = 1, remember thaten ⌘ minn (1 ✓)[↵F I  ⇡(1  B)]
✓(I lˆ) ,
1 ✓
✓ ↵F
o
, which becomes en ⌘ 1 ✓✓ ↵F if  B = 1, implying that [en,N2]
is an empty set and ⌦3 =
´ N2
N1
W ⇤Fdn = ⌦1. Same reasoning applies to prove that BR ( B <  ⇤B) =
BR ( B = 1) = 0. Using simple calculus it can be shown that @⌦3@ B = (1  ✓) ⇡ (en N2), which is
negative because en  N2, as en ⌘ minn (1 ✓)[↵F I  ⇡(1  B)]✓(I lˆ) , 1 ✓✓ ↵Fo and N2  1 ✓✓ ↵F by construc-
tion. In the case of the bankruptcy rate, @BR3@ B  0 because BR3 = (1  ✓) N2 enN and @en@ B  0
.
11 Appendix F: analysis when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F
11.1 Optimal contract and equilibrium welfare under foreclosure when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F
Proposition F1. The optimal contract and equilibrium welfare under foreclosure when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F
is:
l⇤⇤F = lˆ, R⇤⇤F =
I (1 ✓)↵F lˆ
✓ , W
⇤⇤
F = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
.
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Proof. We use the result of Appendix A, according to which l   lˆ, so that D(l) can be rewritten
as D(l) = n
⇣
l   lˆ
⌘
. The optimal contract maximises the manager’s expected utility EUF sub-
ject to the following constraints: (24) manager’s incentive compatibility; (25) lender’s individual
rationality; (26) the repayment cannot exceed the cash flow at t = 1 in the good state of nature
(feasibility constraint); (27) the liquidation value must be greater than or equal to the first-best
value.
max
RF ,lF
EUF = ✓
h
⇡   n(lF   lˆ) RF +  ⇡
i
s.t.:
⇡   n(lF   lˆ) RF +  ⇡   ⇡   n(lF   lˆ) (24)
✓RF + (1  ✓)↵F lF   I (25)
RF  ⇡   n(lF   lˆ) (26)
lF   lˆ (27)
First, we know from the proof of Proposition 5 (Appendix B) that the manager’s incentive
compatibility constraint (24) is not binding at the optimum and the lender’s individual rationality
constraint (25) is binding at the optimum. Second, the feasibility constraint (26) is not binding
at the optimum. To see this, rearrange (26) to obtain RF + n
⇣
lF   lˆ
⌘
 ⇡. Since @EUF@RF < 0 and
@EUF
@lF
< 0 and by lowering RF and lF (26) holds a fortiori, one would like to decrease RF and lF as
much as possible to increase EUF , which implies that (26) is not binding. But we also need to check
that, if (26) is not binding, i.e., RF +n
⇣
lF   lˆ
⌘
< ⇡, the lender’s individual rationality constraint
(25) still holds. Rearrange (25): RF   1✓ [I   (1  ✓)↵F lF ]. Putting together the two conditions:
1
✓ [I (1  ✓)↵F lF ]  RF < ⇡ n
⇣
lF   lˆ
⌘
. This holds as long as ⇡ n
⇣
lF   lˆ
⌘
  1✓ [I (1  ✓)↵F lF ],
which can be rearranged to ⇡   I✓ + nlˆ   lF
h
n  (1 ✓)✓ ↵F
i
. If n > (1 ✓)✓ ↵F , then the condition is
satisfied if lF  ⇡ 
I
✓+nlˆ
n  1 ✓✓ ↵F
. As (25) binds, rearranging it we find the repayment cost as function of
the liquidation value: RF = I (1 ✓)↵F lF✓ . Plugging this expression into EUF , we have the following
constrained maximisation program: max
lF
EUF = ✓
h
⇡   nlF   I (1 ✓)↵F lF✓ +  ⇡
i
s.t. lF  ⇡ 
I
✓+nlˆ
n  1 ✓✓ ↵F
.
As @EUF@lF <0 iff n >
1 ✓
✓ ↵F , the constraint on lF does not bind either. Hence we have the following
44
unconstrained maximisation program:
max
lF
EUF = ✓
h
⇡   n
⇣
lF   lˆ
⌘
  I (1 ✓)↵F lF✓ +  ⇡
i
Differentiating EUF with respect to lF we have @EUF@lF =  ✓n + (1  ✓)↵F . As @EUF@lF <0 iff
n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F , we have a corner solution: l
⇤⇤
F = lˆ, R⇤⇤F =
I (1 ✓)↵F lˆ
✓ . Plugging those solutions into the
manager’s expected utility and using the fact that the lender breaks even we find the equilibrium
welfare: W ⇤⇤F = (✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
.
11.2 Choice of insolvency institution when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F
11.2.1  B <  ⇤B
If  B <  ⇤B the project cannot be undertaken under bankruptcy, as expressed in Lemma 3, so it is
carried out under foreclosure.
11.2.2  B =  ⇤B
If  B =  ⇤B the manager chooses foreclosure iff W ⇤⇤F   W ⇤B. This is equivalent to I   ✓ ⇡  
✓↵F lˆ, which can be rewritten as  ⇤B   1   ↵F lˆ ⇡ because  ⇤B = I✓ ⇡ . That condition is feasible
because we have assumed ↵l   ⇡ 8l and ↵F > 0 and lˆ>0. Foreclosure is chosen if the optimal
creditor control rights in bankruptcy  ⇤B, the efficiency of foreclosure’s liquidation technology ↵F
and the first-best liquidation value lˆ are high enough. The intuition is that, as  ⇤B increases,
bankruptcy leads to more inefficient liquidations, losing its appeal relative to foreclosure, where
there is always liquidation ( M = 1). Likewise, as ↵F and lˆ increase, the cost of inefficient
liquidations in foreclosure
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
decreases, making it more appealing relative to bankruptcy,
where the cost of such an inefficiency is the maximum:  ⇡.
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11.2.3 1 >  B >  ⇤B
If 1 >  B >  ⇤B the manager chooses foreclosure iffW ⇤⇤F   W ⇤⇤B , which is equivalent to  B   1  ↵F lˆ ⇡ .
Foreclosure is chosen for more values of the creditor control rights in bankruptcy  B the higher
the efficiency of its liquidation technology ↵F and the higher the first-best liquidation value lˆ.
11.2.4  B = 1
If  B = 1 the manager chooses foreclosure iff W ⇤⇤F   W ⇤⇤B , which is equivalent to 1   1   ↵F lˆ ⇡ ,
which is always satisfied because ↵F > 0 and lˆ>0.
11.3 Welfare and bankruptcy rates when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F
If  B <  ⇤B projects cannot be undertaken under bankruptcy, as expressed in Lemma 3, so they are
carried out under foreclosure. Hence the corresponding bankruptcy rate BR4 is 0 and the aggregate
welfare ⌦4 is computed using the equilibrium welfare W ⇤⇤F that is displayed in Proposition E1:
⌦4 =
´ N2
N1
W ⇤⇤F dn =
´ N2
N1
{(✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
}dn
If  B =  ⇤B we know from the analysis of Section 10.2 that the project is undertaken under
bankruptcy if I < ✓ ⇡   ✓↵F lˆ and implemented under foreclosure if I   ✓ ⇡   ✓↵F lˆ. The
corresponding bankruptcy rate isBR5 = (1  ✓) if I < ✓ ⇡ ✓↵F lˆ (all managers use the bankruptcy
system and default with probability (1  ✓)) and 0 otherwise. The aggregate welfare ⌦5 is computed
using Proposition 2 and Proposition F1:
⌦5 =
´ N2
N1
W ⇤Bdn =
´ N2
N1
{(✓ +  ) ⇡ I  1 ✓✓ I}dn if I < ✓ ⇡ ✓↵F ;
´ N2
N1
W ⇤⇤F dn =
´ N2
N1
{(✓ +  ) ⇡ 
I   (1  ✓)
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
}dn otherwise.
If  B >  ⇤B we know from the analysis of Section 10.2 that the project is undertaken under
bankruptcy if  B <  B ⌘ 1 ↵F lˆ ⇡ and implemented under foreclosure if  B    B. The corresponding
bankruptcy rate is BR6 = (1  ✓) if  B < 1   ↵F lˆ ⇡ and 0 otherwise. The aggregate welfare ⌦6 is
computed using Proposition 4:
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⌦6 =
´ N2
N1
W
⇤⇤
B dn =
´ N2
N1
{(✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)  B ⇡}dn if  ⇤B <  B < 1  ↵F lˆ ⇡ ;
´ N2
N1
W ⇤⇤F dn =´ N2
N1
{(✓ +  ) ⇡   I   (1  ✓)
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
}dn otherwise.
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SUPPLEMENTS (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
January 4, 2015
1 Supplement A: analysis without restrictions in the value of the initial outlay
In the baseline model we have assumed I  ✓ ⇡ to ensure that financing is possible under the bankruptcy system,
as the optimal bankruptcy code is  ⇤B =
I
✓ ⇡ and the non-optimal one is  B >  
⇤
B . In this supplement we remove
that assumption to see whether credit can still be provided and under which conditions.
If I > ✓ ⇡, then  ⇤B and  B would be greater than 1: hence bankruptcy is unfeasible. The intuition comes from
analysing the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint:
 B ⇡   RB (1)
Plugging R⇤B =
I
✓ into the above equation we obtain:
 B ⇡   I
✓
(2)
If the initial outlay is too high (i.e., I > ✓ ⇡) then the contract is not incentive-compatible, as the maximum
expected punishment from defaulting strategically, max { B ⇡} =  ⇡, is lower than the benefit from carrying out
such a strategy, R⇤B =
I
✓ .
By contrast, in the case of foreclosure, the incentive compatibility constraint of the manager is not binding at
the optimum, as shown in the proof of Proposition 5 (see Appendix B). Hence, the only restriction on the value of
I comes from the fact that the equibrium welfare must be weakly positive (otherwise, the agents would not sign
the contract).
From Proposition 5 we know that welfare isW ⇤F = (✓ +  )⇡ I (1  ✓) [ ⇡   ↵F I] ✓n(I  lˆ) when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F .
W ⇤F   0 is equivalent to I  ✓(1+ )⇡+✓nlˆ[1+✓n (1 ✓)↵F ] . As the RHS of that inequality1 is greater than ✓ ⇡, projects withh
✓ ⇡, ✓(1+ )⇡+✓nlˆ[1+✓n (1 ✓)↵F ]
i
are feasible under foreclosure when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F .
From Appendix E we know that welfare is W ⇤⇤F = (✓ +  )⇡ I  (1  ✓)
h
 ⇡   ↵F lˆ
i
when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F . W
⇤⇤
F   0
is equivalent to I  ✓ ⇡ + ✓⇡ + (1  ✓)↵F lˆ. As the RHS of that inequality is greater than ✓ ⇡, projects with
I 2
h
✓ ⇡, ✓ ⇡ + ✓⇡ + (1  ✓)↵F lˆ
i
are feasible under foreclosure when n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F .
1Notice that, as 0 < n  1 ✓✓ ↵F , the denominator of the RHS is positive and lower than 1.
1
Hence, for projects with high values of the initial outlay I -and, correspondingly, low NPV- only one insolvency
institution, foreclosure, is feasible.
2 Supplement B: analysis when the lender is not perfectly competitive
In the main model it has been assumed that the lender is perfectly competitive. However, this may not be a realistic
assumption in some countries, especially in the case of some bank-based oriented financial systems if the banking
sector is highly concentrated. In such a case firms are very dependent on banking credit -as most companies have
limited access to capital markets- and competition among banks is not strong enough to enable firms to retain all the
profits from the projects. The aim of this supplement is to show a version of the model that relaxes the assumption
of perfect competition, proving that the model’s conclusions are robust to different degrees of competition in the
credit market. Specifically, it will be shown that, as in the main model, the level of overinvestment in capital under
bankruptcy is lower than under foreclosure, i.e., l⇤B < l⇤F , as well as the probability of inefficient liquidations, i.e.,
 ⇤B   ⇤F .
For the sake of simplicity let us assume, like in the baseline model, ↵B = 0. We depart from perfect competition
by assuming that the lender has some bargaining power. Following Suárez and Sussman (2007) we assume that
the manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the lender with probability   and the lender makes the offer with
probability 1  . Since we have already solved the contracts for the case where the manager makes the offer in the
main model, what we need to do is to solve those contracts for the other case and then combine the results. The
main findings are summarised in Propositions B1, B2 and B3.
Proposition B1. The optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B and the optimal contract under bankruptcy {R⇤B , l⇤B} are
 ⇤B =  
⇣
I
✓ ⇡   1
⌘
+ 1, R⇤B =  
I
✓ + (1   ) ⇡, l⇤B = lˆ.
Proof. Let us first find the solution for the case where the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the manager.
The optimal contract and the optimal bankruptcy code maximise the lender’s expected utility ⇧B subject to the
following constraints: (3) the manager does not default strategically (incentive compatibility); (4) the manager
decides to undertake the project (individual rationality); (5) since the manager is wealthless, the repayment cannot
exceed the cash flow at t = 1 in the good state of nature (first feasibility constraint); (6) the liquidation probability
 B lies in the interval [0, 1] (second feasibility constraint); (7) the liquidation value must be greater than or equal
to the first-best value. Formally, the maximisation problem is the following:
2
max
RB , B ,lB
⇧B = ✓RB   I
s.t.:
 B ⇡   RB (3)
✓
h
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   B) ⇡   0 (4)
RB  ⇡   n(lB   lˆ) (5)
0   B  1 (6)
lB   lˆ (7)
To solve this problem, first notice that, if (5) holds, then (4) must hold, so that we can ignore the latter. To
see this rearrange (4): RB  1✓
h⇣
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) +  ⇡
⌘
+ (1  ✓) (1   B) ⇡
i
. The RHS of (4) is larger than the
RHS of (5) because ✓ < 1,  ⇡ > 0 and  B  1. Now notice that, since @⇧B@RB > 0, the lender chooses l⇤B = lˆ to
increase the RHS of (5) as much as possible. Plugging l⇤B = lˆ into (5) and rearranging (3) as RB   B ⇡ we see
that, if (3) holds, then (5) must hold, so we can ignore the latter. (3) must be binding at the optimum because, if
it was slack, we could raise RB to increase ⇧B . Now plug RB =  B ⇡ into (6) and rearrange to obtain RB   ⇡.
Since @⇧B@RB > 0, the previous constraint must be binding at the optimum, so we get R
⇤
B =  ⇡. Then it follows that
 ⇤B = 1. Finally, let us check that the lender’s utility is non-negative: ⇧⇤B = ✓R⇤B   I = ✓ ⇡   I   0 which is true
because I  ✓ ⇡ by assumption.
The optimal bankruptcy code and the optimal contract under bankruptcy are just weighted averages of those
where the manager has all the bargaining power (shown in Proposition 2) and those where the lender has all the
bargaining power (just shown), where the weights are the probabilities of each scenario,   and 1   .
Proposition B2. The optimal contract {R⇤⇤B , l⇤⇤B } under (non-optimal) bankruptcy is R⇤⇤B =  I✓ +(1   ) B ⇡,
l⇤⇤B = lˆ.
Proof. Let us first find the solution for the case where the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the manager.
The optimal contract maximises the lender’s expected utility ⇧B subject to the following constraints: (8) the
manager does not default strategically (incentive compatibility); (9) the manager decides to undertake the project
(individual rationality); (10) since the manager is wealthless, the repayment cannot exceed the cash flow at t = 1
in the good state of nature (feasibility constraint); (11) the liquidation value must be greater than or equal to the
first-best value. Formally, the maximisation problem is the following:
3
max
RB ,lB
⇧B = ✓RB   I
s.t.:
 B ⇡   RB (8)
✓
h
⇡   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   B) ⇡   0 (9)
RB  ⇡   n(lB   lˆ) (10)
lB   lˆ (11)
The solution of the problem follows the same steps as the previous maximisation program, yielding R⇤⇤B =  B ⇡
and l⇤⇤B = lˆ. Let us check that the lender’s utility is non-negative: ⇧
⇤⇤
B = ✓R
⇤⇤
B   I = ✓ B ⇡   I   0. This
can be rewritten as  B   I✓ ⇡ . Remember that  ⇤B = I✓ ⇡ is the optimal bankruptcy law when the manager has
all the bargaining power (Proposition 2) and that the non-optimal bankruptcy code in that scenario is  B >  ⇤B
(Proposition 4). Hence the non-optimal bankruptcy code is weakly higher than I✓ ⇡ regardless of who has the
bargaining power.
The optimal contract under (non-optimal) bankruptcy {R⇤⇤B , l⇤⇤B } is just the weighted averages of R⇤⇤B and l⇤⇤B
where the manager has all the bargaining power (shown in Proposition 4) and where the lender has all the bargaining
power (just shown), where the weights are the probabilities of each scenario,   and 1   .
Proposition B3. The optimal contract under foreclosure when n  1 ✓✓ ↵F is:
R⇤F =  
I (1 ✓)↵F I
✓ + (1   ) ⇡, l⇤F =  I + (1   )
h
⇡
n (1   ) + lˆ
i
.
Proof. Let us first find the solution for the case where the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the manager.
The optimal contract maximises the lender’s expected utility ⇧F subject to the following constraints: (12) the
manager does not default strategically (incentive compatibility); (13) the manager decides to undertake the project
(individual rationality); (14) since the manager is wealthless, the repayment cannot exceed the cash flow at t = 1
in the good state of nature (feasibility constraint); (15) the liquidation value must be greater than or equal to the
first-best value. Formally, the maximisation problem is the following:
4
max
RF ,lF
⇧F = ✓RF + (1  ✓)↵F lF   I
s.t.:
 ⇡   RF (12)
✓
h
⇡   n(lF   lˆ) RF +  ⇡
i
  0 (13)
RF  ⇡   n(lF   lˆ) (14)
lF   lˆ (15)
To solve this problem, first notice that, if (14) holds, then (13) must hold, so that we can ignore the latter. Now
rearrange (14) as RF + n(lF   lˆ)  ⇡. (14) is binding at the optimum because, if it was slack, we could increase
RF and/or lF to increase ⇧F . (12) is also binding because @⇧F@RF > 0, so we obtain R
⇤
F =  ⇡. Plugging R⇤F into (14)
and rearranging we get l⇤F =
⇡
n (1   )+ lˆ. Because ⇡ > 0, n > 0 and 0 <   < 1 we have l⇤F > lˆ, i.e., (15) is satisfied
but not binding.
The optimal contract under foreclosure {R⇤F , l⇤F } is just the weighted averages of R⇤F and l⇤F where the manager
has all the bargaining power (shown in Proposition 5) and where the lender has all the bargaining power (just
shown), where the weights are the probabilities of each scenario,   and 1   .
Now let us compare the equilibrium liquidation values under (optimal and non-optimal) bankruptcy (Propo-
sitions B1 and B2) with those in foreclosure (Proposition B3). In bankruptcy those are l⇤B = l⇤⇤B = lˆ while in
foreclosure it is l⇤F =  I + (1   )
h
⇡
n (1   ) + lˆ
i
with n  1 ✓✓ ↵F . Since l⇤F > lˆ, we conclude that the level of
overinvestment in capital under bankruptcy is lower than under foreclosure2.
With regards to the equilibrium liquidation probabilities, recall that in foreclosure  F = 1 by assumption. Under
optimal bankruptcy  ⇤B =  
⇣
I
✓ ⇡   1
⌘
+ 1  1 since I  ✓ ⇡. Under non-optimal bankruptcy 0 <  B  1. Hence
the probability of inefficient liquidations under bankruptcy is (weakly) lower than under foreclosure.
3 Supplement C: bankruptcy rates and size
Although the available evidence is rather limited, it seems that small firms, when financially distressed, use the
bankruptcy system much less than large companies in the same situation. Claessens and Klapper (2005) find a
negative correlation between bankruptcy rates and firm size in their sample of 35 countries. Morrison (2008, 2009)
2In the baseline model we have set n  1 ✓✓ ↵F to exclude cases where there is no overinvestment in capital under mortgage. But,
for completeness, the equilibrium contract for n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F is shown in Appendix F. Using that result and the one in this section we
obtain R⇤⇤F =  
I (1 ✓)↵F lˆ
✓ + (1   ) ⇡, l⇤⇤F =  lˆ + (1   )
h
⇡
n (1   ) + lˆ
i
for n > 1 ✓✓ ↵F . As l
⇤⇤
F > lˆ the conclusion is the same in
that scenario: the level of overinvestment in capital under bankruptcy is lower than under foreclosure.
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documents this fact in the US and García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) do the same in Spain. Hence, it
may be worth analysing the role of firm size to see whether the main conclusions of our base model change or not.
There are several reasons why small firms may file less for bankruptcy. Small firms usually have few creditors
and they may have engaged in “relationship lending” with their main bank, hence reducing coordination and
asymmetric information problems that are solved best under a bankruptcy procedure (Gilson et al., 1990, Hart,
2000). Personal, rather than corporate bankruptcy laws may apply to small firms (Fan and White 2003, Berkowitz
and White, 2004). But probably the most uncontroversial observation is that bankruptcy procedures are expensive
and that a substantial part of the costs are fixed. According to Bris et al. (2006) and their large sample of
bankruptcies in the U.S., among firms with assets worth less than $ 100,000, the median direct costs burn 23.2%
of asset value. Among firms with assets worth between $ 100,000 and $ 1 million, the median direct costs consume
4.9% of asset value.
In the baseline set up we used a fixed-scale model, so we implictly assumed away firm size from the analysis.
To analyse the role of size let us use instead a variable-scale model with constant returns to scale. Specifically, the
project requires an initial outay I 2 (0,+1) and yields cash-flows ⇡I   n(l   lˆ) (with l =  I) at t = 1 and ⇡I at
t = 2. The probabilities of project success, as well as other features, are the same as in the baseline model. The only
other departure from the benchmark model is that we assume the lender must pay a cost K > 0 for the bankruptcy
procedure to take place. K is fixed, i.e., it does not depend on the firm’s size I, which intends to capture the fact
that a substantial part of the bankruptcy costs may be fixed. From a theoretical viewpoint, this assumption is
related to that of costly state verification models3 where the lender must pay an audit cost K to verify the project’s
income -which can be interpreted as a bankruptcy process (Tirole, 2006). However, in our model the project’s
assets, rather than its cash flows, are the ones that become perfectly verifiable if the audit/bankruptcy is carried
out. Finally, as in the benchmark model, we abstract from renegotiation issues by assuming perfect commitment:
the lender always pays K in the event of default.
3.1 Analysis with ↵B = 0
The model’s main point can be easily made with the particular case of ↵B = 0. This means that the lender pays
K > 0 to be able to trigger liquidation (with probability  B) and hence deter strategic default. The maximisation
program becomes:
3See Townsend (1979) for the seminal paper in this literature.
6
max
RB , B ,lB
EUB = ✓
h
⇡I   n(lB   lˆ) RB +  ⇡I
i
+ (1  ✓)(1   B) ⇡I
s.t.:
 B ⇡I   RB (16)
✓RB + (1  ✓)( K)   I (17)
RB  ⇡I   n(lB   lˆ) (18)
0   B  1 (19)
lB   lˆ (20)
The model solution, which follows the same rationale as in the benchmark model, yields an optimal contractn
R⇤B =
I
✓ +
1 ✓
✓ K; l
⇤
B = lˆ
o
under the optimal bankruptcy code  ⇤B =
1
✓ ⇡ +
1 ✓
✓ ⇡
K
I .
4 Hence: @ 
⇤
B
@I < 0, which means
that, the larger the firm, the lower the optimal creditor control rights in bankruptcy. The intuition of this result
comes from inspecting the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint, which binds in equilibrium:  B ⇡I = R⇤B .
As I increases, while the punishment from defaulting  B ⇡I increases proportionally, the savings from defaulting
R⇤B =
I
✓ +
1 ✓
✓ K increase less than proportionally because K is fixed, allowing for a lower optimal bankruptcy code
 ⇤B . In other words, since the risk premium that the lender charges to the manager is fixed, large firms find their
financing cheaper relative to their profits, reducing the incentives to default.
Now let us remember that  ⇤B is also the minimum liquidation probability that makes the credit contract feasible
under bankruptcy (Lemma 3). Suppose the simplest case, two firms with size IS and IL with IL > IS (small and
large, respectively). Since @ 
⇤
B
@I < 0 then  
⇤
B (IL) <  
⇤
B (IS). If it turns out that the actual bankruptcy code  B is
 ⇤B (IL) <  B <  
⇤
B (IS), then bankruptcy will only be feasible for the large firm (“narrow-scope bankruptcy”, in the
terminology of Ayotte and Yun, 2009)5, implying that, while that firm will be able to choose between bankruptcy
and foreclosure to maximise its profits, the small firm will have to obtain credit through the foreclosure system, even
if it found more profitable to use the bankruptcy system (i.e., in cases where the cost of overinvestment in capital n is
quite high). By contrast, if the bankruptcy code  B is  B    ⇤B (IS) >  ⇤B (IL), then bankruptcy will also be feasible
for the small firm (“wide-scope bankruptcy”), implying that both firms will be able to choose between bankruptcy
and foreclosure to maximise its profits. Hence, we can conclude that a “too-creditor friendly” bankruptcy system
( B    ⇤B (IS)) allows for more insolvency options than a “too-debtor friendly” one ( B <  ⇤B (IS)), in analogous
fashion as what we found with our base model.
4For the optimal bankruptcy code to be feasible (0   ⇤B  1) two parametric assumptions are required: I   (1 ✓)K✓ ⇡ 1 (H1) and
✓ ⇡ > 1 (H2). (H1) means that the scale I is large enough to offset the fixed cost K; (H2) means that the project is profitable enough
per unit of investment.
5 Ayotte and Yun (2009) carry out a similar analysis, but with a fixed-scale model where firms differ in their startup cost and can
“contract-out” bankruptcy.
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